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"GO AND SIN NO MORE": THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
GOVERNMENTALLY FUNDED FAITH-BASED PRISON UNITS
Lynn S. Branham*
This Article discusses faith-based prison programs that immerse prisoners living in
residential units within a prison in a religious atmosphere. Part One analyzes the
constitutionality of these programs under the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. It notes that state action in the prison context receives more deference
from courts than outside the prison context, and that prisoners' constitutional
rights are more constricted than free persons" Part I proceeds to analyze the consti-
tutionality offaith immersion programs in prisons, in light of the Supreme Court s
precedents dealing with prisoners' rights and the Establishment Clause. States can
defend immersion programs on the grounds that these programs are reasonably re-
lated to several important penological objectives, including the interests in
reducing recidivism rates, protecting institutional security, promoting the aims of
restorative justice, and accommodating inmates' religious needs. In addition, the
immersion programs can be constructed in ways that meet the "voluntariness" and
"neutrality" requirements subsumed within the Establishment Clause.
Part II of this Article discusses how religious immersion programs in prison can
best be structured to survive First Amendment challenges. Part II proposes several
important features of an immersion program that will likely enable it to survive or
avoid Establishment Clause challenges: prisoners must be fully informed about the
nature and requirements of an immersion program before they enter it; prisoners
must be allowed to freely chose whether or not to enter such a program, and should
not face a penalty either for deciding not to enter the program orfor attempting to
exit the program; prisons must adopt policies and training regimens designed to
ensure that immersion programs continue to comply with the commands of the
Establishment Clause; prisons must not allow conditions in a faith-based section
of a prison to diverge too widely from conditions in sections of the prison with a
comparable security level; and prison officials ought to allow the religious aspects
of an immersion program to be conducted largely by individuals from the private
sector, rather than government employees. Part II concludes that, properly con-
structed, immersion programs hold substantial promise to advance penological
objectives while surviving constitutional challenges.
* Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Thomas M.Cooley Law School, Grand
Rapids/Western Michigan University Campus; BA. 1976, University of Illinois; J.D. 1980,
University of Chicago Law School. I would like to extend my thanks to my colleague,
Professor Philip Prygoski, for providing me with his comments on an earlier draft of this
article.
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It was March 4, 1998. The Texas prison which I had just entered
seemed, in many ways, like the many other prisons I had visited
over the years. After hearing the familiar clanking of the security
gate as it shut behind me, I realized I had walked into a place that
appeared to fit the prison prototype: a drab world of concrete and
steel. Uniformed correctional officers. And, within the prison
population, a sea of mostly black faces.
But this place was different from the other prisons I had visited.
Profoundly different.
"Greetings in the name of the Lord!" exclaimed the smiling
"community manager," one of the staff persons who worked in the
unit. "Greetings!" over seventy prisoners exuberantly responded.
After an inmate-led prayer, the singing began ... and the clapping.
Unrestrained, seemingly joy-filled clapping.
One of the inmates who was helping lead what was denominated
a "community meeting" called out to his fellow prisoners: "Any-
body find any peace that surpassed understanding?" An inmate
stood up: "I don't know why I feel so much peace.... No matter
how many times you sin, God forgives you." Another inmate stood
up: 'Jesus died on the cross for us," he declared, triggering a cho-
rus of "Amens" across the room.
The inmate leader then opened his Bible and began to read:
"Peace I leave with you; my peace I give you. I do not give to you as
the world gives. Do not let your hearts be troubled and do not be
afraid."'
The "meeting"-an eclectic blend of singing, worshipping, pray-
ing, and sharing of personal insights about God and Jesus-
continued for an hour. Typical inmate comments uttered during
the meeting included: "God is real. He has a plan for each of us. If
you sin, God will lift you up." Another inmate announced confi-
dently: "I have direct access to Jesus!"
At the end of the meeting, the community manager concluded:
"Everything we need is tied up in Jesus.... Our goal is to live a
spirit-filled life. It isn't about doing right. It's about living a right-
eous and holy life in the presence of God. Then prison is far from
us.
1. John 14:27 (New International).
2. The community manager then read from Scripture:
But a time is coming, and has come, when you will be scattered, each to his own
home. You will leave me all alone. Yet I am not alone for my Father is with me.
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In 1998, the prison unit I visited, part of a minimum-security
prison near Houston, was like none other in the United States.
Operated by Prison Fellowship, a Christian organization that min-
isters to prisoners, ex-prisoners, victims, and their families, 3 the
faith-based program, which is called "InnerChange Freedom Initia-
tive," has since been replicated in three other states-Iowa, Kansas,
and Minnesota.4 And though in their infancy, other kinds of faith-
based prison units are appearing in a few other prisons across the
country. For example, in 2002, the Federal Bureau of Prisons
(BOP) issued guidelines for the piloting of five faith-based residen-
tial programs in federal prisons across the country.' Like the
InnerChange Freedom Initiative, the BOP's "Life Connections"
program is designed to provide prisoners with "intense opportuni-
ties for spiritual growth and deepening their religious roots. '6 But
unlike the InnerChange model, the BOP plans to individually con-
tract with "religious/spiritual leaders" from five prescribed faiths-
Catholic, Jewish, Muslim, Native-American, and Protestant-to
provide spiritual guidance to inmates in the faith-based unit.7 In
addition, because one goal of Life Connections is to promote reli-
gious tolerance between persons of different faiths, or those with
no defined faith, the programming in the BOP units includes
multi-faith as well as faith-specific components."
The question, of course, is whether these cutting-edge
correctional programs comport with constitutional requirements,
in particular, the prohibition in the First Amendment of a
I have told you these things, so that in me you may have peace. In this world you will
have trouble. But take heart! I have overcome the world.
Id. 16:32-33.
3. Prison Fellowship Ministries, Values-Based Pre-Release Program Proposal Submit-
ted to Texas Department of Criminal Justice 3 (Oct. 16, 1996) (on file with the University of
MichiganJournal of Law Reform) [hereinafter Prison Fellowship Proposal].
4. Alan Cooperman, Suits Contest Iowa Prison Ministry Program, WASH. POST, Feb. 13,
2003, at A3.
5. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Operation Memorandum No. 021-
2002 (5360) 1 (May 10, 2002). The prisons designated as the sites of the faith-based pro-
grams are located in Victorville, California; Leavenworth, Kansas; Milan, Michigan; Carswell,
Texas; and Petersburg, Virginia, and the prisons have varying security levels-low, medium,
and high. Id.
6. FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, RESIDENTIAL RE-ENTRY PRO-
GRAM: LIFE CONNECTIONS (2002) [hereinafter LIFE CONNECTIONS].
7. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Combine Solicitation, Various
RFQs-Religious/Spiritual Leaders 1-2 (Oct. 30, 2002) (on file with the University of Michi-
gan Journal of Law Reform).
8. LIFE CONNECTIONS, supra note 6.
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governmental "establishment of religion." Part I of this Article
analyzes this seminal constitutional question. Part II follows with a
set of recommendations for policymakers designed to avert
successful Establishment Clause challenges to faith-based prison
units.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FAITH-BASED PRISON UNITS
The First Amendment, which applies to the states via the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 9 protects religious
freedom in two ways. First, the Amendment prohibits the enact-
ment of laws "respecting an establishment of religion." Second, the
Amendment forbids governmental prohibitions on the "free exer-
cise" of religion.
Determining whether faith-based prison units violate the First
Amendment's Establishment Clause first requires an understand-
ing of the non-archetypal way in which the Supreme Court has
interpreted the scope of constitutional protections in the prison
context. Following a discussion of the Supreme Court's construc-
tion of prisoners' rights in general and their religious rights in
particular, this section of the Article reviews the current permuta-
tions of the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence,
a body of law that has been wracked by transitory rules and doc-
trinal shifts. Drawing upon these two lines of authority-Supreme
Court caselaw on prisoners' rights and its decisions interpreting
the constraints the Establishment Clause imposes on the govern-
ment-the section concludes with an analysis of the
constitutionality of faith-based prison units.
A. The Modulated Scope of Prisoners' Constitutional Rights
The line of Supreme Court cases construing the scope of pris-
oners' constitutional rights reveals one consistent theme: the
Constitution applies differently within prisons. One reason for the
different, and decidedly constricted, scope of prisoners' rights is
the Court's marked unwillingness to intercede in the operation of
9. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 489 n.1 (1996).
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prisons and jails. This unwillingness is the outgrowth of several
concerns: First, the Court is fearful that judicial edicts will under-
mine institutional security, imperiling the safety and lives of
correctional staff and inmates.' ° Second, the Court is wary that be-
cause ofjudges' lack of expertise in corrections, their decisions will
impede the realization of the deterrent, retributive, and other pe-
nological aims of incarceration." Third, and relatedly, separation-
of-powers concerns underlie Supreme Court opinions narrowly
interpreting the scope of prisoners' constitutional rights; the Court
has appeared reticent to usurp what it considers the general au-
thority of the legislative and executive branches of the government
to operate and manage prisons. 12 Fourth, and finally, the Supreme
Court has cited federalism as an interest dictating federal courts'
restraint in adjudicating the constitutional claims of state and local
inmates. 13
These amalgamated concerns account for the recurrent empha-
sis in Supreme Court opinions on the need for courts adjudicating
prisoners' constitutional claims to defer to correctional officials'
assessments of what steps are needed to protect institutional secu-
rity and further correctional goals. 14 Moreover, application of this
stated deferential norm when engaging in judicial fact-finding has
transmogrified into the adoption of a legal standard, known as the
Turner test,' 5 whose application makes it difficult, and usually im-
possible, for prisoners to prevail on their constitutional claims.
10. See, e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974) (observing that the determina-
tion of the level at which the number of prison visitors will endanger institutional security
falls "peculiarly within the province and professional expertise of corrections officials").
11. See, e.g., O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987) (noting that the
"evaluation of penological objectives is committed to the considered judgment of prison
administrators"). See also Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05 (1974) ("[T]he prob-
lems of prisons in America are complex and intractable, and, more to the point, they are
not readily susceptible of resolution by decree. Most require expertise, comprehensive
planning, and the commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province
of the legislative and executive branches of government.").
12. See, e.g., Turner v. Saley, 482 U.S. 78, 85 (1987) (stating that because prison ad-
ministration falls within the domain of the legislative and executive branches of the
government, "separation of powers concerns counsel a policy ofjudicial restraint").
13. Id. See also Martinez, 416 U.S. at 405.
14. See, e.g., Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 229-31 (2001); O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 349-50;
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547-48 (1979);Jones v. N.C. Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433
U.S. 119, 125-26 (1977); Pell 417 U.S. at 827.
15. The Supreme Court first enunciated this test in Turner, 482 U.S. at 89, although
the Court began to lay the foundation for the adoption of this test in earlier cases, begin-
ning with Pel4 417 U.S. at 822-28. For the Supreme Court's discussion of the Turner test's
precursors, see Turner, 482 U.S. at 86-89.
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The Supreme Court's decision in O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz is, for
our purposes, the most pertinent example of the Court's applica-
tion of the Turner test, because the Court in O'Lone analyzed the
scope of prisoners' religious rights under the First Amendment's
Free Exercise Clause."" In that case, a group of Muslim prisoners
confined in a New Jersey prison filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 after prison officials adopted several policies whose cumula-
tive effect was to prevent many Muslim prisoners from attending
Jumu'ah, a congregational worship service for Muslims held on
Fridays. 7 The Koran mandates attendance at Jumu'ah and pre-
scribes the time period in the afternoon during which the service
must be held.
8
One of the new prison policies whose implementation fore-
closed some Muslim inmates' attendance at Jumu'ah prohibited
prisoners assigned to off-site work details from returning to the
main prison building during the day.'9 Prison officials effected this
policy change to stave off the security problems and administrative
hassles they had encountered when individual inmates were per-
mitted to leave their work crews and return to the main building
during the day. °
Another prison policy at issue in O'Lone generally required the
inmates with the two lowest custody classifications-"gang mini-
mum" and "full minimum"-to work outside the main prison
building.2' The purposes of this policy were to alleviate overcrowd-
ing within the main prison unit during the day and to reserve work
details within the prison for the maximum-custody inmates, who
for security reasons could not be assigned to outside work details.
22
16. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
17. Id. at 344-47.
18. Id. at 345.
19. Id. at 347.
20. Prison officials considered the gate through which prisoners returned to the
prison to be a high-risk area from a security standpoint, because all vehicles and pedestrians
entering the prison passed through this gate. Id. at 342. Consequently, whenever a prisoner
passed through this gate, all vehicular traffic had to be halted while certain entry require-
ments were met, including a search of the prisoner. Id.
In addition, whenever a prisoner working off-site returned to the prison, his entire crew
had to stop working and accompany the prisoner on the return trip, because only one cor-
rectional officer supervised each work crew. Id. According to the prison officials, allowing
prisoners to return midday to the prison, therefore, disrupted the rehabilitative aims of the
work details, frustrating prison officials' goal to simulate working conditions in the outside
world. Id. at 351.
21. Id. at 345-46.
22. Id. at 345-46, 350-51. See also id. at 363-64 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
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In determining whether the prison officials had unconstitution-
ally abridged the Muslim inmates' religious rights in O'Lone, the
Supreme Court applied the Turner test.2 Under this test, prison
rules and practices that allegedly encumber prisoners' constitu-
tional rights must be "reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests" to pass constitutional muster.2 4 This test has four compo-
nents. As a threshold requirement, a policy that inhibits the
exercise of a constitutional right must have a "valid, rational con-
nection" to a "legitimate" and "neutral" governmental interest." If
the connection between the prison policy and this interest is so
attenuated that the policy is, in the words of the Supreme Court,
"arbitrary or irrational," the policy constitutes an unconstitutional
encroachment on prisoners' rights. 2 6 On the other hand, if the
contested policy meets the threshold requirement needed to sus-
tain its constitutionality, a court applying the Turner test will
balance three remaining factors: one, whether the inmates have
other ways of exercising the right in question; two, the availability
of alternative means of achieving the legitimate penological objec-
tives furthered by the restrictive prison policy; and three, the
impact that accommodating the inmates' asserted right will have
on correctional officers, other inmates, and correctional re-
27
sources.
The Turner test's general framework is rather unremarkable, at
least at first glance. Before Turner, the Supreme Court had long
embraced a reasonableness standard when assessing prisoners'
constitutional claims, a standard under which the burden ensuing
from a restriction on prisoners' asserted constitutional rights is
balanced against the need for the particular restriction. 2s All that
Turner did was to elaborate on the structure and components of
this reasonableness standard.
But what is striking about the Court's application of the Turner
test is the way in which the Turner factors are crafted (or, critics
might contend, contrived) to generally foreordain a finding
against a prisoner's constitutional claim. For example, when
23. Id. at 349.
24. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
25. Id. For a discussion of the meaning of this neutrality requirement, see infra notes
88-92 and accompanying text.
26. Id. at 89-90.
27. Id. at 90-91.
28. In Turner, the Supreme Court discussed four earlier cases that laid the foundation
for the Turner test: Pellv. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974);Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners'Labor
Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979); and Block v. Rutherford,
468 U.S. 576 (1984). See 7itrner, 482 U.S. at 86-89.
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assessing the second Turner factor-the existence of alternative
means of exercising the claimed constitutional right, the O'Lone
Court acknowledged that the Muslim prisoners barred from
returning to the main prison building on Friday afternoon had no
other way to attend Jumu'ah.Y Nonetheless, the Court's inquiry
focused on whether the inmates could participate in "other Muslim
religious ceremonies."30 Underscoring that the Muslim prisoners
had not been deprived of "all forms of religious exercise," the
Court concluded that the second Turner factor weighed in favor of
the prison policies' constitutionality.
31
The Supreme Court's expansive interpretation of what consti-
tutes a viable alternative means for inmates to exercise a
constitutional right stands in marked contrast to its constrictive
interpretation of the third Turner factor-whether there exists a
viable alternative means for prison officials to meet the legitimate
penological objectives that purportedly justify an incursion on in-
mates' constitutional rights. In Turner, the Court indicated that if a
correctional alternative entails more than de minimis costs, a court
should not consider it the kind of "obvious, easy" alternative whose
existence belies the restriction's constitutionality.32 Inmates will al-
most always have an alternative way of exercising a right, while
prison officials usually will not have what the courts consider a
"ready"33 alternative means of meeting their penological objectives.
O'Lone v. Shabazz exemplifies how the Court's shaping of the
third Turner factor almost invariably tilts the constitutional calculus
towards a finding that favors prison officials. The Muslim prisoners
in that case cited several alternative ways that prison officials could
accommodate the prisoners' religious obligation to attend
Jumu'ah without undermining the penological objectives of the
policies that prevented their attendance 4 The prisoners suggested,
for example, that Muslim inmates be assigned to an inside work
29. OLone, 482 U.S. at 351.
30. Id. at 352.
31. Id. The Court noted that the Muslim prisoners could meet together for congregate
prayer during non-working hours, were given special pork-free meals to accommodate their
religious scruples, had access to an imam (the Muslim equivalent to a priest, rabbi, or minis-
ter), and were permitted to eat at different times than the rest of the prison population
during the holy month of Ramadan. Id. See also Turner, 482 U.S. at 92 (finding it significant
that inmates generally barred from corresponding with other inmates had not been de-
prived of "all means of expression").
32. Id. at 90-91.
33. Id. at 90.
34. O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 352.
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detail on Fridays or that they work on the weekends instead of
Fridays.5 The Supreme Court summarily rebuffed these sugges-
tions. Inside work details would, according to the Court, conflict
with the prison officials' goal of alleviating institutional crowding
during the day.36 And weekend details would result in the incursion
of more than de minimis costs. Staff would be needed to supervise
those details, and the creation of an "affinity group," in this case
Muslim inmates, might lead to a sense of empowerment amongst
the Muslim prisoners, increasing the likelihood that they would
challenge prison officials' authority.37 The Supreme Court fur-
thermore noted that creating special work details for Muslim
inmates might spawn allegations of favoritism from other inmates
who resented what they perceived as the special treatment of
Muslims.
38
The Supreme Court rendered its decision in OLone v. Shabazz
against the backdrop of Cruz v. Beto,3 9 a prisoners' rights case that
had come before the Court fifteen years earlier. The plaintiff in
Cruz, a Buddhist prisoner, contended that the district court had
erroneously dismissed his complaint alleging an abridgement of
two constitutional rights-his First Amendment right to religious
freedom and his Fourteenth Amendment right to be afforded the
equal protection of the law.4 ° In his complaint, the plaintiff claimed
that prison officials had punished him for sharing his religious be-
liefs with other prisoners, placing him in solitary confinement in
retaliation for his proselytizing.4' In addition, the plaintiff pro-
tested what he considered prison officials' more favorable
treatment of prisoners of other faiths. According to the plaintiff,
prison officials paid only Catholic, Protestant, andJewish chaplains
to minister to the inmates, afforded prisoners access to worship
35. Id.
36. Id. at 352-53.
37. Id. at 353.
38. Id. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, Black-
mun, and Stevens, was quick to note what he considered the prison officials' discrepant
treatment of Muslim prisoners. The officials were, for example, able and willing to provide
the staffing needed to enable Jewish and Christian inmates to attend worship services on the
weekend. Id. at 365 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Nor were the officials concerned that congre-
gations of Jewish and Christian inmates constituted "affinity groups" that would jeopardize
institutional security. Id. at 366. Justice Brennan furthermore emphasized that the prison
officials appeared wholly unconcerned that the accommodation of Christian and Jewish
inmates' religious "preferences" would spark resentment amongst other inmates. Id. at 366-
67.
39. 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (per curiam).
40. Id. at 319-21.
41. Id. at 319.
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services conducted for these dominant religions only, and distrib-
uted Bibles bought by the state, but no other state-purchased
religious texts, to inmates." The plaintiff also alleged that prisoners
attending the religious services of "orthodox" religions earned
points that could help secure more desirable work assignments and
even early parole release.43
The Supreme Court concluded that the district court had erred
in dismissing the plaintiff's complaint.44 The Court emphasized
that if the factual allegations of the complaint were true, as a court
must assume when adjudicating a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff
had suffered an abridgement of his constitutional rights under
both the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 45 Prison officials, ac-
cording to the Court, must provide the plaintiff with "a reasonable
opportunity of pursuing his faith comparable to the opportunity
afforded fellow prisoners who adhere to conventional religious
precepts.4 6 In a footnote, the Supreme Court elaborated that pris-
oners are constitutionally entitled to avail themselves of
"reasonable opportunities" to practice their religion "without fear
of penalty."v
4
The Court took pains in Cruz to emphasize that the comparabil-
ity requirement it had iterated did not require that the
opportunities afforded inmates of one faith to engage in religious
practices be identical to those afforded inmates of other faiths.8
The assignment of facilities and personnel to accommodate pris-
oners' religious needs could vary, for example, based on the
number of adherents within the prison population of a particular
religion.1 Specifically, the Court stated:
We do not suggest, of course, that every religious sect or
group within a prison-however few in number-must have
identical facilities or personnel. A special chapel or place of
worship need not be provided for every faith regardless of
size; nor must a chaplain, priest, or minister be provided
without regard to the extent of the demand."0
42. Id. at 319-20.
43. Id. at 320.
44. Id. at 323.
45. Id. at 322.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 322 n.2.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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B. The Establishment Clause Circa 2003:
A General Overview
The Establishment Clause has two main purposes. First, like its
First Amendment counterpart, the Free Exercise Clause, the Estab-
lishment Clause is designed to protect religious liberty." The
Supreme Court has interpreted the scope of the religious liberty
safeguarded by the Establishment Clause's disapprobation of gov-
ernmental favoritism towards religion broadly, holding that the
constitutional provision safeguards the freedom to be either reli-
gious or irreligious as well as the freedom to adhere to the tenets
of a particular religious sect.
5 2
The Establishment Clause's second main purpose is to insulate
religion from the adverse effects of what the Supreme Court has
described as "corrosive secularism."03 This objective springs from
the recognition that the infiltration of the government into reli-
gious affairs can sap religions of their vitality, because religious
groups might distort their religious practices to fit the strictures set
forth in governmental edicts and rules. 4
For years, the Supreme Court has grappled with the task of de-
fining the test to be applied when adjudicating Establishment
Clause claims. What has proven to be an arduous struggle for the
Court has culminated in the adoption of three different, though
overlapping, Establishment Clause tests. The test applied most fre-
quently is, as one commentator has observed, "aptly named" the
"Lemon test."55 In its original formulation, this test had three com-
ponents, each of which had to be met in order for governmental
linkages with religious groups to not contravene the Establishment
51. In calling for congruent interpretations of the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses "in light of the single end which they are designed to serve," Justice Goldberg ob-
served: "The basic purpose of the religion clause of the First Amendment is to promote and
assure the fullest possible scope of religious liberty and tolerance for all and to nurture the
conditions which secure the best hope of attainment of that end." Abington Sch. Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
52. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 589 (1992) (referring to the protection the
Establishment Clause accords the "dissenting nonbeliever").
53. School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 385 (1985). See also Abington
Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 259 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("It is not only the nonbe-
liever who fears the injection of sectarian doctrines and controversies into the civil polity,
but in as high degree it is the devout believer who fears the secularization of a creed which
becomes too deeply involved with and dependent upon the government.").
54. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 608 (Blackman,J., concurring).
55. Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 115, 118
(1992). The Supreme Court first articulated this test in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
612-13 (1971).
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Clause. First, the legislation or governmental program challenged
on First Amendment grounds had to have a secular purpose. 6 Sec-
ond, the "principal or primary effect" of the statute or program
had to be something other than the advancement or curtailment
of religion. And third, the contested actions of the government
could not spawn "excessive government entanglement with relig-
ion.",
5
The Supreme Court has modified the Lemon test somewhat. In
Agostini v. Felton, the Court concluded that the Lemon test's third
prong-its prohibition of "excessive" governmental entanglement
in religious affairs-duplicates its second prong-the bar on gov-
ernmental actions whose dominant impact is to promote or inhibit
religion. Consequently, the Court has condensed the Lemon test
into a two-part test, with the examination of the extent to which
the government is entangled with religion subsumed within the
broader inquiry into the primary effect of a statute or governmen-
60tal program.
Another test propounded by the Supreme Court for the evalua-
tion of Establishment Clause claims is known as the "endorsement
test." ,' Simply stated, under this test actions that would be per-
ceived by the "reasonable observer" as reflecting governmental
62
endorsement of religion contravene the Establishment Clause.
The "coercion test" is the third and final test that the Supreme
Court has applied in cases in which claimants asserted that the
government had transgressed the boundaries imposed by the Es-
tablishment ClauseY. This test, as its name suggests, proscribes
governmental compulsion to adhere to or disavow certain religious
tenets or to engage in or refrain from engaging in certain religious
56. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 613.
59. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232-33 (1997).
60. Id. at 233.
61. Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ., 185 E3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 1999).
62. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 655 (2002). Courts are, however, to
charge the "reasonable observer" with an understanding of the "history and context" of a
program that has sparked an Establishment Clause challenge. Good News Club v. Milford
Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 119 (2001) (quoting Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v.
Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 780 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment)).
63. Freiler, 185 E3d at 343.
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practices.6 At the heart of this test is a revulsion for "state-created
orthodoxy" in religious matters.
C. Assessing the Constitutionality of Faith-Based
Prison Units Under the Establishment Clause
1. Application of the Turner Test
a. The Case for Applying the Turner Test to Prisoners' Establishment
Clause Claims-In determining whether faith-based units in prisons
invariably abridge the Establishment Clause, the threshold ques-
tion is what test or tests are to be applied when making that
determination-the Turner test, the tests applied when analyzing
Establishment Clause claims outside the prison context, or some
alternative test. The Supreme Court has stated unequivocally that
the Turner test is to be applied "to all circumstances in which the
needs of prison administration implicate constitutional rights."66
Thus far, the Supreme Court has applied the Turner test to prison-
ers' claims alleging impingements of their First Amendment right
to freedom of speech, 7 their constitutional right to marry,68 their
right to associate with friends and family members via prison vis-
its, 69 their right to freely exercise their religious freedom ,70 their
due-process right not to be medicated involuntarily with anti-
psychotic drugs,71 and their constitutional right to have access to
the courts.72
Shaw v. Murphy illustrates what appears to be the Suprelme Court's
current penchant to apply the Turner test to the brunt of prisoners'
constitutional claims. 7s In Turner, the Court had already resolved that
the constitutional standard enunciated in that case applied to
prisoners' claims alleging that restrictions on nonlegal, prisoner-to-
prisoner correspondence abridged their communicative rights
64. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992).
65. Id. at 592.
66. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224 (1990) (emphasis added). Significantly,
and a bit ironically, the pivotal question before the Court in Harper was whether the Turner
test applies only to claims asserted under the First Amendment. Id.
67. Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 228, 231 (2001); Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S.
401,404 (1989); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 91-93 (1987).
68. Turner, 482 U.S. at 97-99.
69. Overton v. Bazzetta, 123 S.Ct. 2162, 2167-70 (2003).
70. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 350-53 (1987).
71. Harper, 494 U.S. at 224-27.
72. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 361-62 (1996).
73. Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223 (2001).
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subsumed within the First Amendment.7 4 But in Shaw, the prisoner-
plaintiff contended that this lax standard should not be extended
to restrictions on legal correspondence between prisoners, in other
words, to restrictions on correspondence involving a legal claim
that might be or had been asserted by or against a prisoner.7
The Supreme Court spurned this argument, emphasizing that
Turner had iterated a "unitary, deferential standard for reviewing
prisoners' constitutional claims. 7"' The Court refused to vary the
rigor with which it analyzed a constitutional claim based on its per-
ception of the "value" of the content of a communication.7 7 In
other words, the Court was unwilling to assume that correspon-
dence between prisoners regarding legal matters was more
important, and therefore more worthy of constitutional protection,
than correspondence on nonlegal matters.
The Court in Shaw also asserted another reason for its reluc-
tance to craft an exception to the Turner test. Wary that such an
exception would augment federal-court intrusion into the prolixi-
ties of prison administration, the Court refused to abate, even in
this limited context, its deferential review of the constitutionality of
prison officials' actions that purportedly further legitimate pe-
nological interests.78
The line of Supreme Court cases, including Shaw v. Murphy, in
which the Court has applied the Turner test to an array of prisoners'
constitutional claims seems to support the application of that test to
prisoners' claims alleging violations of the Establishment Clause.
7
',
Application of an elevated standard of review to Establishment
74. Turner, 482 U.S. at 91-93.
75. Shaw, 532 U.S. at 528.
76. Id. at 229.
77. Id. at 230 ("To increase the constitutional protection based upon the content of a
communication first requires an assessment of the value of that content. But the Turner test,
by its terms, simply does not accommodate valuations of content.").
78. Id. at 230-31.
79. The lower courts are currently divided on the question whether the Turner test ap-
plies to prisoners' Establishment Clause claims. Some courts have held that the Turner test
applies to such claims. See, e.g., Howard v. United States, 864 . Supp. 1019, 1025 (D. Colo.
1994). Other courts have applied the same tests to prisoners' Establishment Clause claims
that are applied to nonprisoners' claims. See, e.g., Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 188-92
(Tex. 2001). Still other courts have adopted a middle-of-the-road position, holding that the
Turner test does not apply unless the prison program contested on Establishment Clause
grounds is designed to accommodate the religious needs of other inmates. See, e.g., Scarpino
v. Grosshiern, 852 . Supp. 798, 804-05 (S.D. Iowa 1994) (applying the Lemon test to a
prison's alcoholic rehabilitation program patterned after Alcoholics Anonymous that the
court found, based on the record before it, was not designed to accommodate participants'
religious needs).
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Clause claims would seem to connote that religious communica-
tions with and between prisoners are more or less deserving of
constitutional protection than other kinds of communications, a
conclusion at odds with Shaw's premise that application of the
Turner test should not be modulated based on "valuations of con-
tent."s°
In addition, exempting Establishment Clause claims from the
Turner test's rubric would lead to the dissonant treatment of pris-
oners' free-exercise claims and their claims rooted in the
Establishment Clause. As mentioned earlier,1 the Supreme Court
has already concluded that the Turner test applies to prisoners'
claims predicated on the First Amendment's Free Exercise
Clause. Since the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment
Clause share a commonality of purpose-to protect religious lib-
erty-assigning preeminent value to the Establishment Clause
seems discordant, not in keeping with the overarching goal of what
one would assume should be complimentary, not conflicting, con-
stitutional provisions. Indeed, it is difficult to envision that the
analysis of the Supreme Court and the result in OLone v. Shabazz
would have been different if the prisoners asserting a free-exercise
claim in that case had instead or in addition challenged the more
favorable treatment of Christian and Jewish inmates on establish-
83ment-of-religion grounds.
Applying a heightened standard of review to prisoners' Estab-
lishment Clause claims would also conflict with the deferential
mode of constitutional adjudication embraced by the Supreme
Court in prisoners' cases. As mentioned earlier,84 the Supreme
Court has touted four reasons for the judicial deference to prison
officials' penological judgments embodied in the Turner test-the
importance of safeguarding institutional security; the interest in
ensuring that judges do not impede the realization of penological
objectives because of their lack of correctional expertise; the need
to respect the boundaries subsumed within the separation of pow-
ers; and the primacy of the interest in limiting the encroachment
on states' authority that ensues when federal courts intervene in
what the Supreme Court has termed the "formidable task" of man-
aging state and local correctional institutions." None of these
80. Shaw, 532 U.S. at 230.
81. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
82. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 350-53 (1987).
83. For a discussion of this case, see supra notes 16-38 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
85. O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 342.
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reasons are implicated any less when there has been an argued af-
front to the Establishment Clause as opposed to some other
constitutional provision, a point whose validity will become evident
when the penological objectives that can be served by faith-based
prison units are discussed later in this Article.
b. The Constitutionality of Faith-Based Prison Units Under the Turner
Test-Assuming that the Turner test is the appropriate test to apply
when adjudicating prisoners' Establishment Clause claims (or is at
least the appropriate starting point when adjudicating such
claims), the next step is to apply that test in assessing the constitu-
tionality of faith-based prison units. That assessment is, of course,
impeded by the reality that faith-based prison units can vary greatly
from a programmatic perspective. They can, for example, pre-
scribe very different requirements-both substantive and
procedural-that must be met in order for a prisoner to be admit-
ted into a faith-based prison unit. They can also vary in the extent
to which and ways in which they accommodate prisoners with dif-
fering religious preferences, if they accommodate them at all. And
faith-based prison units can differ substantially in their day-to-day
operations, including the extent to which religious practices and
explicit discussions of religion suffuse the program.
The varied ways in which faith-based units may be structured
and operated forecloses a finding that such units are invariably
constitutional. What can be determined feasibly, though, is
whether faith-based units are invariably unconstitutional, in other
words, whether a faith-based prison unit can be incorporated into a
correctional facility's programming options in a way that comports
with the requirements of the Establishment Clause. It is to that
general question that this Article now turns.
i. The First Turner Factor-As noted earlier,s7 in order for a
prison policy or program that allegedly impinges on a constitu-
tional right to pass muster under the Turner test, the policy or
program must, as an initial matter, have a "valid, rational connec-
tion" to a "legitimate" and "neutral" governmental interest. At first
glance, it might appear that a faith-based prison unit abridges the
86. A faith-based unit structured to conform to a warden's edict that the unit reflect
and adhere to the warden's personal views regarding what are the "correct" religious pre-
cepts, for example, would clearly abridge the Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Williams v. Lara,
52 S.W.3d 171, 191-92 (Tex. 2001) (holding the jail's "Chaplain's Education Unit," that the
sheriff admitted was operated to accord with "the yardstick of [his] own belief system," vio-
lated the Establishment Clause).
87. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
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neutrality requirement of the first Turner factor, because the gov-
ernment, by establishing the unit, arguably has signified its support
for the religious views communicated to, and inculcated within,
that unit's prisoners.
The way in which the Supreme Court has defined "neutrality"
within the meaning of the Turner test, however, forecloses this ar-
gument. In Thornburgh v. Abbott,88 the Supreme Court considered a
First Amendment challenge to prison regulations restricting the
publications prisoners could receive. The Court acknowledged in
that case its statement in Turner that it was "important" to deter-
mine whether an alleged incursion on a prisoner's First
Amendment rights operated "without regard to the content of the
expression. '"8 9 The Court also admitted that regulations providing
for the censorship of communications to prisoners might appear to
flout this content-neutrality requirement, because censorship deci-
sions are grounded "to some extent, on content."90 Nonetheless,
the Supreme Court concluded that the censorship regulations did
not violate Turner's neutrality requirement, constrictively interpret-
ing the scope of that requirement in the process. According to the
Court, a regulation or practice is "neutral" within the meaning of
the Turner test as long as it advances an "'important or substantial
governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expres-
sion. "'' Because the censorship restrictions at issue in Thornburgh
were "rationally related" to the interest in safeguarding institu-
tional security, the Court found that they met this narrowly defined
neutrality requirement.
92
Turner's requirement that a prison policy or program challenged
on constitutional grounds be rationally connected to a "legitimate"
governmental interest poses an equally surmountable constitu-
tional hurdle for faith-based prison units. These units appear
reasonably related to a number of legitimate governmental inter-
ests, some of the most significant of which are highlighted below.
First, faith-based prison units are rationally connected to the
government's legitimate, and indeed compelling, interest in reduc-
ing recidivism rates. The track record of prisons in reducing
recidivism rates has, thus far, been abysmal. The most current na-
tional data on recidivism rates reveal that within three years after
88. 490 U.S. 401 (1989).
89. Id. at 415 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90 (1987) (internal quotations
omitted)).
90. Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 415.
91. Id. (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974)).
92. 490 U.S. at 415-16.
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their release from prison, 68% of ex-prisoners are rearrested for a
crime, typically a felony or serious misdemeanor." During that
same time period, more than half (52%) of the released prisoners
are reimprisoned, whether for having committed a crime or for
having otherwise violated a condition of their release from prison.' 4
It is therefore no wonder that prison officials would want to ex-
plore and institute alternative prison programming that might
curb the proclivity of many prisoners to persist in committing
crimes after they are released from prison. And social-science re-
search suggests that faith-based units hold promise in meeting that
objective.
Researchers have striven to determine the impact, if any, of re-
ligion on crime and delinquency.9 A person's religiousness can be
measured in a number of different ways. One way is to assess relig-
iousness based on self-reports---on a person's reported religious
beliefs and perceptions of his or her own religiousness. 9' Another
common way of measuring religiousness is to calculate the fre-
quency with which a person participates in particular kinds of
religious activities, such as attendance at a church, synagogue, or
97
mosque.
Most studies have found that there is an inverse relationship be-
tween religiousness, however it is measured, and crime and
delinquency.9" In other words, religion seems to have an inhibiting
effect on the commission of crimes. In addition, researchers have
repeatedly found a negative correlation between religion and cer-
93. PATRICK A. LANGAN & DAVID J. LEVIN, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. SPECIAL REP.: RE-
CIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994, at 1, 3-4 (U.S. Dep't of Justice, 2002). This
recidivism study was conducted in fifteen states. Of the 744,480 crimes with which the rear-
rested ex-prisoners in those states were charged, over 100,000 were violent crimes, including
2900 homicides. For a further breakdown of the crimes with which the released prisoners
were charged, see id. at 4.
94. Id. at 1. In the national study from which these statistics were drawn, approximately
25% of the released prisoners were resentenced to prison for a new crime. Id. Slightly over
26% were returned to prison for a "technical violation" of a release condition. Id. Failing a
drug test and failing to meet with a parole officer at a directed time are classic examples of
such technical violations. Id.
95. See BYRON R. JOHNSON ET AL., OBJECTIVE HOPE: ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
FAITH-BASED ORGANIZATIONS: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 33 (2002) (listing forty-six
studies that have examined the relationship between religion and crime or delinquency). See
also Colin J. Baier & Bradley R.E. Wright, "If You Love Me, Keep My Commandments": A Meta-
Analysis of the Effect of Religion on Crime, 38J. REs. CRIME & DELINQ. 3 (Feb. 2001).
96. Baier & Wright, supra note 95, at 13.
97. Id.
98. For the cumulative results of these studies, see id. at 16 and JOHNSON ET AL., supra
note 95, at 7, 12-13.
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tain other deviant behaviors that are closely linked with crime and
delinquency. In particular, researchers have concluded that reli-
gious beliefs or involvement in a religion can curb the drug and
alcohol abuse that is often a precursor to crime. 9 For example, a
study conducted by the National Center on Addiction and Sub-
stance Abuse at Columbia University found that adults who
consider their religious beliefs to be "unimportant" are three times
likelier than adults who strongly believe that their religious beliefs
are important to binge drink, six times likelier to smoke marijuana,
and four times likelier to use an illicit drug other than marijuana.'
Regular attendance at religious services is also negatively corre-
lated with alcohol and drug abuse. Adults who do not attend
religious services are seven times likelier to binge drink, eight
times likelier to smoke marijuana, and five times likelier to use il-
licit drugs other than marijuana than adults who attend religious
services at least once a week. 0'
Research findings on the effects of faith-based prison units on
recidivism rates are also promising, though very preliminary. A re-
cent evaluation of Prison Fellowship's InnerChange Freedom
Initiative (IFI) found that offenders who completed the program
had a much lower recidivism rate than several other groups of
prisoners with whom they were compared. 0 2 Over a two-year pe-
riod, 8% of the IFI "graduates" were reincarcerated. °3 By contrast,
19% of the offenders who volunteered for, but did not participate
in, IFI were reincarcerated as were 22% of the offenders deemed
eligible for the program but who did not participate either because
they did not volunteer or were not selected. "04 And another
99. See, e.g.,JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 95, at 7, 12; NAT'L CENTER ON ADDICTION AND
SUBSTANCE ABUSE, So HELP ME GOD: SUBSTANCE ABUSE, RELIGION AND SPIRITUALITY 2, 7-
10 (2001).
100. Id. at 2, 8. Similarly, teenagers who depreciate the significance of their religious be-
liefs are much more prone to engage in binge drinking and to consume illegal drugs. Id. at
2 (reporting that teens who rate their religious beliefs as unimportant are three times like-
lier to binge drink, four times likelier to smoke marijuana, and seven times likelier to use
other illicit drugs).
101. Id. at 2, 7. The comparative differences between teenagers who do not attend reli-
gious services and those who attend such services at least weekly are equally stark, with the
nonattenders more than three times as likely to binge drink and use marijuana and almost
four times as likely to use other kinds of illegal drugs. Id. at 2, 9.
102. CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY COUNCIL, INITIAL PROCESS AND OUTCOME EVALUATION
OF THE INNERCHANGE FREEDOM INITIATIVE: THE FAITH-BASED PRISON PROGRAM IN TDCJ
23 (2003).
103. Id. at 23.
104. Id.
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matched group of prisoners who met IFI's selection criteria but did
not participate in the program had a 20% reincarceration rate. °5
A second legitimate penological objective to which faith-based
prison units are linked, and rationally so, is the paramount gov-
ernmental interest in protecting institutional security. It is
tautological, but true, that prisoners are subject to a host of rules
and restrictions during the period of their incarceration. One
overarching purpose of these constraints on prisoners is to safe-
guard institutional security and to maintain discipline and order
within the correctional facility. Specifically, many prison rules are
designed to facilitate the monitoring of prisoners by correctional
staff, to avert inmate attacks on other inmates or staff, to limit
damage to, or theft of, property, and to prevent prison escapes.
The problem of prisoners breaking prison rules is pervasive and
recurrent. More than half of all prisoners are charged with one or
more disciplinary infractions during their term of confinement, 
°
and this statistic, of course, does not include prisoners who commit
disciplinary infractions that go undetected or do not result in the
filing of charges. Many, though not all, disciplinary infractions are
also crimes. Thus, prisoners who, for example, steal, intentionally
damage property, attempt to escape from prison, or assault others
can be subject to internal administrative sanctions as well as crimi-
nal prosecutions.
0 7
Because so many disciplinary infractions are also crimes, the re-
search data revealing that religion is, in one researcher's words, a
"persistent ... inhibitor of adult crime"'00 provides empirical sup-
port for the proposition that religion can have an inhibitory effect
on disciplinary infractions. But has this proposition been estab-
lished definitively to be true? The answer, in a nutshell, is no. The
research on the impact of religion (including participation in reli-
gious activities) on the misconduct of prisoners is sparse, although
one of the most comprehensive analyses of this subject to date
105. Id.
106. JAMES STEPHAN, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. SPECIAL REP.: PRISON RULE VIOLATORS 1
(1989) (reporting that 53% of surveyed prisoners had committed one or more rule viola-
tions since the incipiency of their confinement).
107. As a practical matter, prosecutors are often reluctant, however, to file criminal
charges against inmates. This reticence stems, at least in part, from the difficulty of proving
an inmate's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt when the witnesses to the crime are often other
inmates, whose credibility is discredited. Mark Hansen, Brutal Findings: Prison Rapists Go
Unpunished, Victims Go Unrepresented, A.B.A. J.,July 2001, at 16.
108. Byron R. Johnson et al., Religious Programs, Institutional Adjustment, and Recidivism
AmongFormer Inmates in Prison Fellowship Programs, 14JusT. Q. 145, 163 (1997).
[VOL. 37:2
"Go and Sin No More"
found a statistically significant inverse relationship between in-
mates' religiousness and their confinement for disciplinary
infractions.'0 In addition, the limited research that has thus far
been conducted to measure the tangible effects of religion on in-
mates' conduct inside and outside prisons has been plagued with
methodological problems."'
However, these gaps in the empirical research do not foreclose a
finding of a "valid, rational connection" between faith-based prison
units and the legitimate governmental interest in preserving institu-
tional security. The Supreme Court has never required conclusive
proof or even empirical evidence that a prison policy or regulation
actually reduces security problems in order for the policy or regula-
tion to survive a constitutional challenge. For example, in Jones v.
North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc.,"' the Supreme Court con-
sidered whether prison regulations that prohibited prisoner union
meetings, barred inmates from soliciting other inmates to join the
union, and banned the bulk mailing of union materials to prisoners
violated the First Amendment. "2 Prison officials invoked institu-
tional security in defending the constitutionality of these
restrictions. "3 Specifically, the prison officials argued that prisoners
who joined a labor union could act collectively to defy prison offi-
cials' authority, provoking chaos and even violence within the state's
prisons.1 14 The district court, however, emphasized that the prison
officials had failed to adduce any evidence that prisoner unions had
in fact disrupted prison operations in the past.11 5 Consequently, the
109. Todd Clear et al., Prisoners, Prison, and Religion: Religion and Adjustment to Prison, 35 J.
OFFENDER REHAB. 152 (2002).
110. Some of these methodological problems include small and unrepresentative samples
and a dearth of long-term, longitudinal studies. See, e.g.,Johnson et al., supra note 108, at 160-
61; Mark C. Young et al., Long-Term Recidivism Among Federal Inmates Trained as Volunteer Prison
Ministers, 22J. OFFENDER REHAB. 97, 115 (1995). See generallyJoHNSON ET AL., supra note 95, at
21 (citing examples of the methodological problems that typify studies of the efficacy of faith-
based programs, problems that can be traced in part to the lack of adequate funding of this
kind of research).
111. 433 U.S. 119 (1977).
112. The Supreme Court also addressed whether the no-meeting rule and the prohibition
on the bulk mailing of union materials violated the prisoner labor union's right to be accorded
equal protection of the law. Id. at 122-23. This equal-protection claim was predicated on the
fact that two other organizations, the Jaycees and Alcoholics Anonymous, were permitted to
hold meetings in the prison and to distribute bulk mail to prisoners. Id. at 123.
113. Idat126-27.
114. Id. at 127.
115. Id. at 124. Specifically, the district court noted: "There is not one scintilla of evidence
to suggest that the Union has been utilized to disrupt the operation of the penal institutions."
N. C. Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., v.Jones, 409 E Supp. 937,944 (E.D.N.C. 1976).
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district court ruled that the restrictions on prisoner labor unions
were unconstitutional.
6
The Supreme Court reversed this ruling, underscoring the so-
licitous regard that courts should accord prison officials'
judgments regarding the best means of protecting and promoting
institutional security."17 Specifically, the Court noted that because
the prisoners had failed to demonstrate that the prison officials'
beliefs regarding the steps they needed to take to safeguard institu-
tional security were "unreasonable," the district court had erred in
requiring the prison officials to further corroborate their claim
that the restrictions on prisoner labor unions would make the
state's prisons safer and more secure.'"" The burden was not, ac-
cording to the Court, on the prison officials to prove the accuracy
of their security assessments and the efficacy of the measures em-
ployed to diminish perceived risks to institutional security.11 9
Instead, the burden of proof lay with the prisoners; "in the absence
of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the officials
have exaggerated their response" to institutional security concerns,
courts should, the Supreme Court remonstrated, "ordinarily defer
to [prison officials'] expertjudgment" on security matters.2 °
Requiring empirical validation of prison officials' judgment that
faith-based prison units can make their prisons safer and easier to
manage conflicts with the deferential norm espoused in Jones and
the panoply of other Supreme Court cases narrowly interpreting
the scope of prisoners' rights.12 ' In addition, requiring such statisti-
cal proof of a prison program's effectiveness would substantially
undercut the ability of prison officials to adopt cutting-edge pro-
grams as well as new prison rules to curb security problems and
meet other legitimate penological objectives. When prison pro-
grams and rules are truly innovative, the data confirming their
efficacy simply will not exist.
A third touted purpose of faith-based prison units is to promote
what is commonly known as "restorative justice." 2 Restorative jus-
tice stands in stark contrast to the retributive ethos that still
116. Id. at 944-45.
117. Jones, 433 U.S. at 128.
118. Id. at 127-28.
119. Id. at 128.
120. Id. (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974)).
121. For examples of Supreme Court cases manifesting this deferential norm, see supra
note 14.
122. See, e.g., PROGRAMS & SERVICES Div., TEXAS DEP'T OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, "INNER
CHANGE": FAITH-BASED PRE-RELEASE PROGRAM 2 (2000) [hereinafter TDCJReport].
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permeates most criminal-justice systems in this country.2 ' In juris-
dictions that subscribe to retribution as the paramount penological
objective of the criminal-justice system, criminal sanctions are im-
posed primarily for punitive purposes-quite simply, because it is
felt that offenders deserve to be punished for their wrongdoing.
1 2 4
By contrast, the focus of restorative justice is on reparation and
reconciliation. 2 5 One of the underlying premises of restorative jus-
tice is that offenders need to recognize the error and real-life
impact of their aberrant behavior and then assume responsibility
to repair, to the extent possible, the harm their criminal conduct
has caused their victims and their community. 126 In short, the goal
of a criminal-justice system grounded on restorative-justice princi-
ples is to foster the accountability of, and victim empathy within,
criminal offenders and to provide victims with the opportunity, if
they choose, to experience the healing that can ensue from engag-
ing in a constructive dialogue with the offender and identifying
through a collaborative process how the offender can make
amends to the victim and others harmed by his or her criminal
conduct.
Victim-offender mediation programs are a classic means
through which restorativejustice principles are implemented.'
2 7
Typically, a victim and offender participating in one of these pro-
grams meet together in the presence of a trained mediator. 28 The
victim is first afforded the chance to describe the impact of the of-
fender's crime on the victim and to seek the answers to questions
that may have been haunting the victim, such as why the offender
chose to commit the crime.9 The offender, in turn, can discuss the
crime from his or her perspective, including the impetus for the
crime. 30 This dialogue between the victim and the offender often
culminates in an expression of remorse by the offender for the
crime. 13 1 In addition, during the mediation session, the offender
123. For a list of the many distinctions between restorative justice and retribution, see
HOWARD ZEHR, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE, RETRIBUTIVE JUSTICE, NEW PERSPECTIVES ON CRIME
AND JUSTICE 18 (1985).
124. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 29-30 (4th ed. 2003).
125. DANIEL VAN NESS & KAREN HEETDERKS STRONG, RESTORING JUSTICE 31-34, 41
(1997).
126. MARK S. UMBREIT, THE HANDBOOK OF VICTIM OFFENDER MEDIATION XXViii, Xxxi
(2001).
127. MARK S. UMBREIT, VICTIM MEETS OFFENDER: THE IMPACT OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
AND MEDIATION 5 (1994).
128. UMBREIT, supra note 126, at xxvii.
129. Id. at xxxviii, 51-52.
130. Id. at 51.
131. VAN NESS & STRONG, supra note 125, at 71; UMBREIT, supra note 127, at 9.
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and the victim typically enter into an agreement outlining the re-
parative measures, such as the payment of restitution or the
performance of community-service work, that the offender will
undertake to remedy the harm that his or her criminal conduct
caused the victim and the community.
132
Faith-based prison units represent a new paradigm for the im-
plementation of restorative-justice principles. Such units can
broaden the scope, and potentially enhance the efficacy, of the re-
parative efforts undergirding restorative-justice programs. For
example, one of the precepts underlying Prison Fellowship's In-
nerChange Freedom Initiative is that before an offender can truly
accept the forgiveness proffered by a victim, the offender must first
have forgiven himself or herself.3 3 Without this self-forgiveness, full
healing and restoration-for the victim, the offender, their fami-
lies, and the community-cannot, it is felt, occur.
Of course, the self-forgiveness that a faith-based prison unit can
help cultivate is, to many religious believers, closely linked to an
understanding of, and depth of appreciation for, another kind of
forgiveness, one that is a centerpiece of InnerChange",4--God's
forgiveness. The question is whether the religious roots of the self-
forgiveness that faith-based prison units may strive to encourage
and nurture in prisoners living in those units illegitimatizes the
governmental interest in restorative justice to which faith-based
prison units are connected.
For at least three reasons, the answer to that question is and
should be no. First, and importantly, other penological objectives
that the Supreme Court has already deemed "legitimate" from a
constitutional perspective also have religious roots. For example,
one of the early incantations of, and foundations for, retribution
can be found in the Old Testament verse importuning that "life
132. VAN NESS & STRONG, supra note 125, at 71. The victim and the offender may also
identify steps that the offender should take to rectify the problems, such as substance abuse,
that helped to catalyze the offender's decision to engage in criminal behavior. Id. at 71-72.
133. Prison Fellowship Proposal, supra note 3, at 24.
134. See, e.g., 7DCJ Report, supra note 122, at 2 (stating that InnerChange reflects a
"'restorative justice' model, that is, the offender's restoring of himself to his family, his
community, his victims, to himself and ultimately to God"); Prison Fellowship Proposa supra
note 3, at 23 (citing InnerChange's emphasis on prisoners' "need for restoration with their
family, community, andJesus Christ").
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shall go for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for
foot.
'
1
3 5
Second, history itself contraindicates abnegating a governmental
interest's legitimacy simply because that interest or the means
through which it is implemented has its origins in a religious belief
or practice. Otherwise, penitentiaries would themselves be ipsofacto
unconstitutional, because they were, as their name suggests, first
devised to propel prisoners, through a period of forced isolation,
to become penitent before God for their past crimes, making it less
likely that they would commit other crimes in the future. 136 And
state laws prohibiting the execution of insane prisoners on death
row might arguably be unconstitutional, because those laws are
grounded, in part, on the religious conviction that prisoners
should be able to seek God's forgiveness for their sins before being
put to death.
1 3 7
Third, although the adherents of some religious sects might dis-
pute this point, the self-forgiveness that can facilitate the
reconciliatory aims of restorative justice is a secular concept, even
though self-forgiveness can have sectarian origins; in other words,
self-forgiveness is not invariably forged through, nor is it always the
byproduct of, the acceptance of God's forgiveness. The govern-
ment can, therefore, appropriately establish and support programs
to encourage prisoners to first forgive themselves-to, in secular
terms, "put their pasts behind them"-so that they can make
amends more effectively to their victims and the community ag-
grieved by their criminal behavior. The government's support for
restorative-justice mechanisms that place an emphasis on self-
forgiveness does not necessarily undercut the legitimacy of the in-
terest in restorative justice furthered by faith-based prison units,
whether or not that self-forgiveness is derived from religious beliefs
or the imparting of such beliefs.
A fourth legitimate governmental interest to which faith-based
prison units are linked is the interest in accommodating prisoners'
religious freedom. Courts have uniformly recognized that this.in-
terest permits prison officials to hire chaplains to minister to
135. Deuteronomy 19:21 (King James) (emphasis in the original). In Hudson v. Palmer,
468 U.S. 517, 524 (1984), the Supreme Court, with seeming approval, cited retribution as
one penological objective.
136. AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASS'N, THE AMERICAN PRISON: FROM THE BEGINNING
31, 38 (1983).
137. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 407 (1986). In Ford, the Supreme Court held
that executing an insane prisoner violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishments. Id. at 409-10.
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inmates without abridging the Establishment Clause. 138 These hold-
ings spring from the recognition that many prisoners' religious
needs would go unfulfilled without this and other forms of gov-
ernmental subsidization of religion in the prison context.
13
9
Because incarceration can foreclose inmates' access to religious
groups and services in the outside world, prison officials can there-
fore constitutionally take, and have a legitimate interest in taking,
affirmative steps to mitigate the effects of government-erected bar-
riers facing prisoners who want to grow and develop spiritually or
simply learn more about religion.
Affording inmates access to a faith-based prison unit presents
inmates with a more complete continuum of options in the area of
religious programming. Prisoners can, of course, choose to totally
spurn religious practices and beliefs. Or they can choose to ex-
plore spiritual matters on their own-through reading, reflection,
and prayer. Alternatively or in addition, prisoners can congregate
with others in an effort to nurture their spiritual growth, meeting
together, for example, to study the tenets of a particular religion or
to worship. And finally, with the addition of faith-based prison
units, prisoners can choose a kind of immersion approach to relig-
ion, which enables prisoners to continually assess their thought
processes, the decisions they make, and their behavior, including
criminal behavior, from a spiritual perspective.
Within correctional systems, there are analogs for this kind of
programming continuum. 140 For example, inmates with substance-
abuse problems may simply participate in educational programs
that provide instruction on the perils of drug and alcohol abuse
and other related subjects. Alternatively, inmates with a history of
drug or alcohol abuse may participate in treatment programs that
typically include counseling, whether individual or group, at speci-
138. See, e.g., Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 192 (Tex. 2001); Theriault v. Silber, 547
E2d 1279, 1280 (5th Cir. 1977); Protestants & Other Americans United for Separation of
Church & State v. O'Brien, 272 F. Supp. 712, 721 (D.D.C. 1967).
139. See Montano v. Hedgepeth, 120 F.3d 844, 850 n.10 (8th Cir. 1997) ("[S]tates might
commit a technical violation of the Establishment Clause by even hiring prison chaplains.
Nonetheless, this is condoned as a permissible accommodation for persons whose free exer-
cise rights would otherwise suffer."). In similarly holding that the hiring of chaplains to
minister to military personnel comports with the Establishment Clause, courts have rea-
soned that the religious needs of persons in the military might not otherwise be met, in part
because of their physical isolation from religious providers. See, e.g., Katcoff v. Marsh, 755
E2d 223, 227-28, 234 (2d Cir. 1985).
140. See, e.g., BEST PRACTICES: EXCELLENCE IN CORRECTIONS 428 (Edward E. Rhine ed.,
1998) (listing the gradation of drug-abuse treatment services within the Federal Bureau of
Prisons).
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fled times. Finally, inmates in some prisons can be housed in
"therapeutic" drug-treatment units.14' In those therapeutic units,
the treatment of the prisoners is interwoven into the formal, day-
to-day programming within the unit as well as into informal inter-
actions with staff.142 Thus, incorporating faith-based units into a
prison system, like therapeutic treatment units, is in keeping with
the recognition that a one-size-fits-all approach to meeting prison-
ers' needs will often not work-whether prison officials are striving
to meet inmates' physical, spiritual, or treatment needs.
In sum, faith-based prison units are rationally connected to a
number of legitimate governmental interests, including the inter-
est in reducing released prisoners' recidivism rates, the interest in
protecting institutional security, the interest in promoting restora-
tive justice, and the interest in accommodating prisoners' religious
needs. These units therefore pass scrutiny under the first Turner
factor.
ii. The Second Turner Factor-The second factor to be consid-
ered when analyzing a prisoner's constitutional claim under the
Turner test is the extent to which the prisoner has an alternative
means of exercising the right in question. 43 This factor seems in-
apposite when a prisoner is asserting an Establishment Clause
violation. A prisoner's claim grounded on the Establishment
Clause is essentially a claim to be free from governmentally or-
dained religion. In other words, the prisoner is invoking what
might be described as a "negative right"-the right not to be sub-
jected or exposed to something that is constitutionally proscribed.
It is therefore a non sequitur to speak of alternative ways to insulate
a prisoner from something whose very existence is unconstitu-
tional.
But does the inaptness of the second Turner factor mean that the
Turner test has no bearing in the Establishment Clause context?
The Supreme Court's decision in Washington v. Harpe& 44 suggests
otherwise. One of the prisoner-plaintiffs claims in that case was
that he had a constitutional right, grounded in due process, not to
have antipsychotic medication administered to him over his
objection unless he had been found incompetent to give
141. For a description of the inner workings of one such unit, see BUREAU OF JUST. As-
SISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, THE WISCONSIN DRUG ABUSE TREATMENT UNIT (1990).
142. Id. at 2 (reporting that therapeutic drug-treatment units "operate on the assump-
tion that the possibility of changing behavior is greatly enhanced if the inmate's entire
waking life is a corrective learning experience").
143. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90 (1987).
144. 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
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consent. 45 Like a prisoner alleging a violation of the Establishment
Clause, the prisoner in Harper was invoking a "negative right"-in
that case, a right not to be subjected to something that the
prisoner contended was inherently unconstitutional-psychotropic
drugs that were administered involuntarily.
In evaluating this substantive due process claim, the Supreme
Court applied the Turner test. Yet at the outset, the Court ac-
knowledged that only three of the four factors the Court had
outlined in Turner as components of that test were relevant in the
case before it-the nature of the connection between the prison
regulation authorizing the involuntary administration of antipsy-
chotic medication in defined circumstances and the legitimate
governmental interests that it purportedly advanced; the existence
of less drastic means of achieving the regulation's objectives; and
the impact that accommodating the inmate's asserted constitu-
tional right would have on correctional officers, other inmates, and
prison resources. 14 Because it would have been nonsensical to ex-
amine alternative ways that the prisoner could enjoy the right he
claimed not to be medicated involuntarily-he either was involun-
tarily medicated or he was not, the Supreme Court did not,
because it could not, incorporate the second Turner factor into its
constitutional analysis. Nonetheless, the Court proceeded to apply
those components of the Turner test that could be applied feasibly
to the constitutional claim before it. Thus, although the second
Turner factor weighs neither in favor of nor against the constitu-
tionality of faith-based prison units, its irrelevance to the
constitutional calculus does not counsel against applying the
Turner test when assessing those units' constitutionality under the
Establishment Clause.
iii. The Third and Fourth Turner Factors-The third Turner factor
encapsulates whatever less drastic means exist to achieve the legiti-
mate penological objectives of a policy or program whose
constitutionality is contested, while the fourth factor examines
whether and how other people and prison resources would be ad-
versely affected if prison officials were required to recognize the
constitutional right asserted by a prisoner.'4 In reality, these two fac-
tors are not wholly distinct; they overlap considerably. The Supreme
145. Id. at 222.
146. Id. at 225-27.
147. Id. at 224-25.
148. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90-91.
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Court has said that a purportedly less restrictive means of further-
ing a legitimate penological objective will not be considered a
viable option depreciating the constitutionality of a prison policy
or program if the adoption of that alternative would lead to the
incursion of more than de minimis costs."4 Likewise, the fourth
Turner factor entails an assessment of the costs, both pecuniary and
nonpecuniary, that would be incurred if prisoners were accorded a
claimed constitutional right. Consequently, it is appropriate to con-
join the analysis of the third and fourth Turner factors when
assessing the constitutionality of faith-based prison units under the
Establishment Clause, just as the Supreme Court itself has done on
occasion.5 °
When examining whether there are "obvious, easy alternatives" 5'
to the incorporation of faith-based units into a prison system, it is
important to remember that it is not incumbent on prison officials
to demonstrate that alternatives that do not arguably implicate the
Establishment Clause do not exist or are unworkable. In the words
of the Supreme Court, "prison officials do not have to set up and
then shoot down every conceivable alternative method of accom-
modating the claimant's constitutional complaint." 52 Instead, the
burden rests with prisoners to prove that prison officials have an
alternative means of accomplishing the legitimate governmental
objectives of a faith-based prison unit-an alternative that would
result in the incursion of no more than de minimis Costs.
1
This is a burden that prisoners simply cannot meet, in no small
part because faith-based units represent a cutting-edge innovation
in correctional operations. As mentioned earlier in this Article, the
research on the effects of faith-based prison units is at a prelimi-
nary stage, although research findings suggest, thus far, that these
units can have recidivism-reducing and security-enhancing bene-
fits.1 4 Consequently, prisoners cannot establish that adopting some
other recourse to accommodate prisoners' religious needs will only
have trivial negative effects on the interests in crime control and
institutional security.
149. Id. at 91.
150. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 352-53 (1987). In concluding in
O'Lone that both the third and fourth Turner factors supported the constitutionality of the
prison policies that prevented Muslim inmates from participating in Jumu'ah, the Court
cited the adverse consequences that might ensue if the alternatives propounded by the pris-
oners were adopted. Id.
151. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90.
152. Id. at 90-91.
153. Id. at91.
154. See supra notes 102-05, 109 and accompanying test.
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Even if a study were to find that a faith-based prison unit had
only a nominal effect on the rate with which released prisoners re-
cidivate and on institutional security, that finding would not, for at
least two reasons, compel the conclusion that the costs of foreclos-
ing this housing and programming option for prisoners are only de
minimis. First, the data results would likely be program-specific. In
other words, the data would bear on the efficacy, in terms of re-
cidivism reduction and the diminution of disciplinary infractions,
of a particular faith-based unit or units. But the effectiveness of a
program may vary greatly depending on how it is structured. Thus,
inconclusive or even disappointing research findings on the effects
of a particular faith-based unit on recidivism and prison security
might simply mean that the way in which the unit is structured and
operated needs to be further refined. Preventing prison officials,
because of preliminary research findings, from calibrating these
pilot or first-generation programs to better achieve their objectives
would itself impose a substantial cost on correctional operations,
precluding the "'local experimentation'" that the Supreme Court
has recognized can be a critical ingredient to the improved deliv-
ery of services to prisoners.1
5
The second reason why a research finding that a faith-based unit
has had little inhibitory effect on prisoners' future criminal behav-
ior or their breaching of prison rules would not foreordain the
conclusion that the third and fourth Turner factors point against
the constitutionality of that and other units is that the adoption of
an alternative to faith-based prison units might still negatively af-
fect the realization of some of the other more intangible, though
no less important, goals of those units. Most significantly, if prison
officials were to pursue a means, other than a faith-based prison
unit, of achieving their goal of reducing crime and infraction rates,
that alternative, even if religious or otherwise spiritual in its orien-
tation, would deny prisoners the option of choosing to participate
in a holistic, twenty-four-hour-a-day program that they believe is the
optimal way of meeting their spiritual needs. In other words, the
alternative would pose more than de minimis costs to prison offi-
cials' legitimate objective to accommodate inmates' religious
155. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 352 (1996) (quoting Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S.
817, 832 (1996)). In Lewis, the Supreme Court reiterated that it is important for courts to
allow prison officials to experiment as they determine how best to ensure that prisoners
have the "meaningful" access to the courts to which they are constitutionally entitled. Lewis,
518 U.S. at 351-52 (internal quotations omitted).
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freedom and interests by providing them with a broader spectrum
of religious programming options from which to choose.
Thus, it seems fairly evident that the third and fourth Turner fac-
tors weigh in favor of the constitutionality of faith-based prison
units. Compelling the closure or precluding the establishment of
such units would thwart the potential of these units to reduce
crime and to make prisons safer and more secure. In addition, the
adoption of alternatives to faith-based prison units would foreclose
prison officials from meeting prisoners' religious needs in the way
that the prisoners themselves have deemed most beneficial to their
growth and development, spiritual or otherwise.
2. Application of a Hybrid Test to Prisoners' Establishment Clause
Claims-As discussed earlier in this Article, 156 the case for applying
the Turner test to prisoners' Establishment Clause claims appears,
at least at first glance, strong. The Supreme Court has stated that
this test is to be applied to all constitutional claims brought by
prisoners, 57 and since Turner was decided, the Supreme Court has
generally adhered to this unequivocal pronouncement. 15 Exempt-
ing Establishment Clause claims from the Turner test's rubric
would, in effect, accord this constitutional provision more favored
treatment than other constitutional protections, including others
subsumed within the First Amendment. Most notably, instead of
construing the two constitutional provisions designed to protect
religious liberty in pari materia, an elevated standard of review
would be applied to Establishment Clause claims, while the Turner
test, with all its laxity, would be applied to claims grounded on the
Free Exercise Clause.1
9
But applying the Turner test in its original form to prisoners' Es-
tablishment Clause claims could lead to results both discomfiting
and at odds with the overarching purpose of both religion
156. See supra notes 66-85 and accompanying text.
157. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224 (1990) ("[T]he standard of review we
adopted in Turner applies to all circumstances in which the needs of prison administration
implicate constitutional rights.").
158. See the cases cited in notes 67-72, supra. The Supreme Court has not applied the
Turner test to prisoners' Eighth Amendment claims. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 834 (1994) (holding that the plaintiff, who alleged that prison officials had subjected
him to cruel and unusual punishment by failing to protect him from another inmate's as-
sault, must prove that the officials acted with "deliberate indifference" to a "substantial risk
of serious harm"). The Court has also not applied the Turner test to inmates' procedural, as
opposed to substantive, due process claims. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 225,
228-35 (1990) (applying the Turner test to the prisoner-plaintiff's substantive due process
claim, but not his procedural due process claims, asserted against a prison policy under
which he was involuntarily medicated with antipsychotic drugs).
159. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
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clauses-the protection and nurturing of religious liberty. For ex-
ample, as discussed earlier in this Article, faith-based prison units
pass the Turner test, because they are "reasonably related" to a
number of "legitimate" and "neutral" governmental interests, in-
cluding the interest in diminishing the recurrence of criminal
activity by released prisoners. Yet if this reasonable relationship is
all that is needed to obviate Establishment Clause problems, then
prison officials likely could force prisoners to live in faith-based
units, no matter how vociferous the prisoners' objections to this
housing assignment and how antithetical the religious beliefs and
practices that suffuse those units are to prisoners' own religious
precepts (or lack thereof). Such compelled assignments would be
constitutional provided that the requisite link exists between the
prisoners' presence, even though involuntary, within the unit and a
legitimate penological objective, such as the goal of reducing re-
cidivism rates.' 60
However, such government-compelled involvement in religion
would flout the central command of the Establishment Clause-
that "government may not coerce anyone to support or participate
in religion or its exercise ... . Consequently, because the Estab-
lishment Clause is, in some respects, sui generis, it appears as
though the Turner test would need to be somewhat amplified to
accommodate the Clause's unique underpinnings.
a. The Proscription of Governmental Coercion-The absence of gov-
ernmental coercion in a prisoner's decision to live and participate
in a faith-based unit is obviously a critical ingredient of the unit's
constitutionality. In a number of Supreme Court cases, some of
them quite recent, upholding the constitutionality of transmitting
government funds to religious schools,'62 the Court underscored
160. If assignments to faith-based units were involuntary, then they would clearly no
longer be reasonably related to the legitimate interest in accommodating prisoners' reli-
gious freedom and preferences. In addition, such compulsory assignments would seem at
odds with the faith-based units' objective of promoting restorative justice, because a key
premise underlying restorative justice is that victims' and offenders' participation in restora-
tive-justice programs should be voluntary to achieve their reconciliative objectives.
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, VICTIM-OFFENDER MEDIATION/DIALOGUE PROGRAM RE-
QUIREMENTS, RECOMMENDATION APPENDIX TO REP. ioiB, SUMMARY OF ACTION OF THE
HOUSE OF DELEGATES, 1994 ANNUAL MEETING (1994). Yet studies might (or might not)
someday reveal that faith-based units reduce recidivism or infraction rates even amongst
prisoners who initially resisted an assignment to such a unit.
161. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992).
162. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 663 (2002) (upholding school
voucher program under which tuition aid was funneled to parents and then to the elemen-
tary school of their choice, including private religious schools); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S.
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that the funneling of government money to a religious group or
institution was the end-product of "genuine and independent
choices of private individuals."6 3 For example, in Zelman v. Sim-
mons-Harris, the Court upheld a tuition-aid program through which
state funds were transmitted to elementary public and private
schools, including religious schools. 16 4 Invoking a circuit-breaker
analogy, the Court concluded that the "true private choice" of stu-
dents to attend a religious school severed "the circuit" between
government and religion.6 5 As a result, any Establishment Clause
concerns with the tuition-aid program were, according to the
Court, nullified.
But how, one might ask, can a prisoner's coerced presence in a
faith-based prison unit be differentiated from a voluntary assign-
ment to such a unit? Obviously, in order for this housing and
programming assignment to be considered the "true private
choice" of a prisoner, the decision whether or not to be transferred
to the faith-based unit must be remitted to the prisoner. In other
words, prison officials cannot exercise their typically unmitigated
discretion to house an inmate in a prison and, more specifically, in
a particular part of a prison that best meets the needs of, and risks
posed by, the prisoner.'66 Officials cannot, in short, direct that the
prisoner be placed in a faith-based unit.
167
793, 830-31 (2000) (plurality) (finding a school-aid program constitutional under which
federal funds were transmitted to state and local agencies which, in turn, purchased books,
computers, and other materials and equipment to be loaned to public and private schools,
including parochial schools); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 228 (1997) (holding program
through which public school teachers were sent into parochial schools to provide remedial
education to students who opted to attend those schools to be constitutional); Zobrest v.
Catalina Foothills School Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 10, 12-13 (1993) (holding that the Establishment
Clause permits government officials to accord parents the "freedom to select a school of
their choice," including a religious school, into which a government-paid interpreter will be
sent to provide services to their deaf child); Witters v. Washington Dep't of Services for the
Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 488 (1986) (concluding that vocational-assistance program did not
abridge the Establishment Clause even though the state was subsidizing a blind person's
education at a Christian college; "the decision to support religious education is made by the
individual, not by the State").
163. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 649.
164. Id. at 663.
165. Id. at 652.
166. For a discussion of Supreme Court cases holding that prisoners typically have no
liberty interest in being assigned to, or remaining in, a particular prison or section of a
prison, see infra notes 168-83 and accompanying text.
167. That does not necessarily mean that prison officials must acquiesce in a prisoner's
request to be transferred to a faith-based unit. Legitimate considerations, including
institutional-security concerns and limited space in the program, may foreclose such a
transfer. For example, prison officials could appropriately refuse to transfer a prisoner
classified at a maximum-custody level to a faith-based unit in a minimum-security prison.
Thus, while the Establishment Clause prohibits prison officials from requiring prisoners to
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Nor can prison officials pressure prisoners to opt for such a
placement. But that rather self-evident point raises a question
whose answer is less clear: Does the existence of more favorable
conditions in a faith-based unit, such as a lower rate of inmate-on-
inmate assaults, place the kind of pressures on an inmate to live in
the unit that constitute governmental coercion in the constitu-
tional sense? Both Supreme Court caselaw and pragmatic
considerations suggest otherwise.
i. Supreme Court Caselaw-A number of Supreme Court cases
buttress the conclusion that the disparity between the conditions of
a faith-based unit and those in other parts of the prison or in other
prisons typically does not exert governmental compulsion on a
prisoner to opt for a placement in the faith-based unit. In the first
line of arguably relevant Supreme Court cases, the Court con-
fronted the question of when the transfer of a prisoner effects a
deprivation of a "liberty interest," thereby triggering the protec-
tions of due process. One of those cases was Meachum v. Fano.' In
that case, several prisoners filed a civil-rights suit after they were
transferred to prisons with "substantially less favorable conditions"
because of their suspected involvement in setting fires within the
prison in which they were confined initially.69 The plaintiffs, most
of whom were transferred from a medium-security prison to a
maximum-security prison, contended that the transfers deprived
them of "liberty" within the meaning of the Due Process Clause.7
However, the Supreme Court responded that a conviction and
prison sentence extinguish a prisoner's liberty to the extent that
correctional officials can place a convicted offender in any prison
that they deem most suitable.171 Prisoners therefore have no consti-
tutionally-derived liberty interest to be assigned to, or remain
within, a particular prison."'
live in a faith-based prison unit, the officials are vested with what is, in effect, a veto power;
they can bar a prisoner's transfer to such a unit, at least if their decision is grounded on a
legitimate governmental interest.
168. 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
169. Id. at 216-18, 221.
170. Id. at 222.
171. Id. at224.
172. Id. at 225 ("Confinement in any of the State's institutions is within the normal lim-
its or range of custody which the conviction has authorized the State to impose. That life in
one prison is much more disagreeable than in another does not in itself signify that a Four-
teenth Amendment liberty interest is implicated when a prisoner is transferred to the
institution with the most severe rules.").
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State law is an alternative source of the liberty to which the Due
Process Clause affords protection,'73 but the Supreme Court has
signaled that the transfer of an inmate to a prison or section of a
prison with more oppressive conditions normally does not impli-
cate a state-created liberty interest either.74 Specifically, in Sandin v.
Conner, the Court held that the transfer of a prisoner from the
general-population unit of a prison to the disciplinary-segregation
unit for thirty days did not deprive him of "liberty" within the
meaning of the Due Process Clause. 7 5 Consequently, the prison
officials were not obliged to incorporate any procedural safeguards
into the disciplinary process to avert the arbitrary or unfounded
imposition of this kind of disciplinary sanction. Only if the prison
officials had inflicted an "atypical and significant hardship on the
inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life" would
he be entitled potentially to the protections of due process. 76 And
according to the Court, confinement in a cell in the disciplinary
unit for twenty-three hours or more a day, compared to twelve to
sixteen hours a day in the general-population unit, did not subject
the prisoner to an "atypical and significant hardship.'
77
The fact-specific nature of Sandin v. Conner arguably limits its
prognosticative value in predicting, whether within or outside the
due-process context, the outcome of cases examining the constitu-
tional repercussions of subjecting prisoners to differing conditions
of confinement. In Sandin, the defendant was sentenced to solitary
confinement for "only" thirty days, 7 leaving open the possibility
that disciplinary confinement for more extended periods of time
would trigger the protections of due process. 79 In addition, the
173. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995).
174. See id. at 486. See also Meachum, 427 U.S. at 226-27 (holding that transfers of pris-
oners from a medium- to a maximum-security prison because of suspected misconduct did
not deprive them of a state-created liberty interest).
175. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486.
176. Id. The Supreme Court inferred that even this kind of aberrational treatment of a
prisoner might not implicate due process when it said: "We hold that Conner's discipline in
segregated confinement did not present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which
a state might conceivably create a liberty interest." Id. (emphasis added).
177. Id. at 486 & n.8.
178. While the Supreme Court seemed dismissive in Sandin about the adverse effects of
segregation for this period of time, researchers have consistently found that solitary con-
finement for a period of time longer than ten days has negative psychological repercussions
on persons subjected to such confinement, triggering psychosis, depression, outbursts of
anger, and suicidal ideation and attempts. Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, Regulating Prisons of
the Future: A Psychological Analysis of Supermax and Solitary Confinement, 23 N.Y.U. REv. L. &
Soc. CHANCE 477, 530 (1997).
179. Cf Lee v. Coughlin, 26 F. Supp. 2d 615, 635-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding that pris-
oner confined in disciplinary segregation for 376 days was deprived of a liberty interest).
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Supreme Court emphasized in Sandin that state officials had ex-
punged the guilty finding that had led to the plaintiff's disciplinary
segregation.8 0 Underscoring that the finding would not "inevitably
affect the duration of [the plaintiffs] sentence," the Court inti-
mated that the outcome of the case would have been different if
state law had required the parole board to deny the plaintiff parole
because of his disciplinary record or, alternatively, had required
the board to grant parole in the absence of such misconduct. 181
Despite Sandin's potentially limited scope, its holding is consis-
tent with a theme that has permeated the Supreme Court cases
examining the question of when a prison housing assignment de-
prives an inmate of "liberty" within the meaning of the Due Process
Clause: variations in prison conditions, including exposure at times
to "much more disagreeable" conditions,I1 2 are the operative norm
in corrections. 3 This norm, to which prisoners have long been ac-
customed, has implications for the question of whether the
existence of somewhat more favorable conditions in a faith-based
unit places unconstitutional pressure on a prisoner to agree to live
in such a unit. In other words, it is arguable that conditions outside
the faith-based unit that do not inflict an "atypical and significant
hardship" on prisoners do not place the kind and degree of coer-
cive pressures on an inmate that would make the unit's very
existence an abridgement of the Establishment Clause.
The Supreme Court's decision in McKune v. Lile s 4 is another in-
dicator that even if conditions of confinement in a faith-based unit
are in certain ways less draconian, those differences do not neces-
sarily mean that correctional officials are unconstitutionally
coercing prisoners to request an assignment to the unit. In that
case, the Supreme Court considered a prisoner's claim that he was
180. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486, 487 n.10.
181. Id. at 487.
182. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976).
183. In concluding in Hewvitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983) that prison officials had not
deprived the plaintiff of a constitutionally-derived liberty interest when transferring him
from the general-population unit to administrative segregation, where he was confined in
his cell almost twenty-four hours a day, the Supreme Court observed: "It is plain that the
transfer of an inmate to less amenable and more restrictive quarters for nonpunitive reasons
is well within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence." Id. at
468. The Court did find that the transfer deprived the plaintiff of a state-created liberty
interest, one that emanated from prison regulations that circumscribed prison officials'
discretion to initiate such transfers. Id. at 472. However, in Sandin, the Supreme Court jetti-
soned the test under which the existence of a state-created liberty interest hinged on the
particular phrasing of a statute or regulation. 515 U.S. at 483-84.
184. 536 U.S. 24 (2002).
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being subjected to compulsion falling within the proscriptions of
the Fifth Amendment-specifically, that the government was com-
pelling him to incriminate himself. The inmate, a convicted sex
offender, had been ordered by prison officials to participate in a
Sexual Abuse Treatment Program (SATP). 5 In order to participate
in the program, sex offenders had to sign an "Admission of Re-
sponsibility" form in which they acknowledged their culpability of
the offense of which they had been convicted. 8" In addition, in-
mates participating in the program had to fill out a sexual-history
form in which they recounted details about their sex lives, includ-
ing their commission of sex crimes with which they had not been
charged. A prisoner's incriminating admissions in these forms
might have a number of deleterious consequences for the prisoner,
exposing him, for example, to the risk of a criminal prosecution
for the uncharged crimes he had admitted committing and making
him vulnerable to a prosecution for perjury if he had denied at
trial committing the crime for which he was incarcerated but for
which he had now admitted responsibility.
1 8
The prisoner who filed suit in McKune challenging the constitu-
tionality of the SATP claimed that prison officials were compelling
him to incriminate himself in contravention of the Fifth Amend-
ment. 89 The prisoner noted that if he refused to make the
incriminating admissions that were a precondition to participation
in the program, he would be transferred from a medium- to a
maximum-security unit.1 90 There, he would be housed in a cell with
four, rather than two, persons, and his freedom to move outside his
cell would be further limited.19' In addition, his prison privileges,
including work opportunities and earnings, visitation rights, and
access to personal property would be reduced dramatically.9 2 For
example, while the plaintiff could earn up to the minimum wage at
his current classification level (Level III), the remuneration for
Level II inmates was capped at sixty cents a day.
9 3
Despite the patent pressures exerted on the plaintiff to incul-
pate himself, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, spurned the
185. Id. at 30.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 55 & n.1 (Stevens,J, dissenting).
189. Id. at 29.
190. Id. at 31.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 30-31.
193. Id. at 63 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In addition, Level II inmates could spend only
$20 each pay period at the canteen, while Level III inmates could spend $140. Id.
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suggestion that these pressures were tantamount to the compul-
sion proscribed by the Fifth Amendment. The majority, however,
split as to its reasoning. A plurality of the Court-Justices Kennedy,
Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas-opined that the analysis of
whether a prisoner is facing compulsion within the meaning of the
Fifth Amendment substantially tracks the analysis undertaken
when determining whether a prisoner is being deprived of a liberty
interest. 94 In other words, unless a prisoner will have to endure
"atypical and significant hardships" for refusing to make inculpa-
tory statements, correctional officials are not placing the kind or
level of pressures on the prisoner that would subvert his or her
privilege against self-incrimination.195
Justice O'Connor rendered the decisive fifth vote in McKune, re-
jecting, like the plurality, the plaintiffs Fifth Amendment claim. In
her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor disagreed with the plu-
rality that in the prison context, compulsion in the Fifth
Amendment sense and deprivation of "liberty" in the Due Process
sense are largely congruent concepts.9 6 Justice O'Connor agreed
with the four dissenters that a prisoner might be subject to the
compulsion barred by the Fifth Amendment without necessarily
being deprived of the "liberty" that garners the protections of Due
Process.' 9 In other words, the compulsion the Fifth Amendment
prohibits encapsulates more than the deprivation of liberty.
What is significant, for our purposes, about the plurality and
concurring opinions in McKune is not their differences, but their
concordant assessment of the impact on prisoners of being trans-
ferred from a medium-security to a maximum-security prison and
of having their classification level ("privilege status") reduced. The
plurality was dismissive about the injurious consequences that
194. The plurality in McKune alluded to the possibility that the Fifth Amendment analy-
sis might vary somewhat from the test applied when determining whether a prisoner has
been deprived of a state-created liberty interest. See id. at 37 ("The determination under
Sandin whether a prisoner's liberty interest has been curtailed may not provide a precise
parallel for determining whether there is compelled self-incrimination, but it does provide
useful instruction for answering the latter inquiry."). In fact, as part of its analysis in McKune,
the plurality first examined whether the SATP was reasonably related to a legitimate pe-
nological interest before turning to the question whether the adverse consequences that
followed a refusal to participate in the program constituted "atypical and significant hard-
ships" compared to those prisoners typically faced in prison. Id. at 36-38.
195. Id. at 37-38.
196. Id. at 48 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
197. Id. ("I agree with Justice Stevens that the Fifth Amendment compulsion standard is
broader than the 'atypical and significant hardship' standard we have adopted for evaluating
due process claims in prisons ... ").
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would ensue from the plaintiff's decision not to incriminate him-
self, describing them as more like "de minimis harms" than the kind
of grievous consequences that would trigger Fifth Amendment
concerns. l' And while Justice O'Connor acknowledged that the
conditions of the plaintiffs confinement would now be "more un-
pleasant," the adverse consequences triggered by his refusal to
participate in the sex-offender treatment program in accordance
with its terms were, in her opinion, relatively "minor." """
McKune v. Lile arguably provides support for the proposition that
just because conditions in a faith-based prison unit are in certain
ways less onerous than those in other parts of the prison or other
prisons does not mean that prison officials are coercing inmates'
participation in the unit, in violation of the Establishment Clause.
However, Justice O'Connor added a caveat in her concurring opin-
ion in McKune that could limit its import and scope significantly.
Responding to the plaintiff's argument that prison officials were
coercing him to inculpate himself by threatening to transfer him to
what the district court had described as a "more dangerous" prison
unit if he did not acknowledge and disclose past sex crimes, Justice
O'Connor noted that the trial court had not entered a finding
specifying with exactitude the degree to which the maximum-
security unit was more dangerous than the medium-security unit in
which the plaintiff was currently housed. 20 0 This allusion to an evi-
dentiary gap leaves open the possibility that the outcome of
McKune might have been different-that a majority of the Court
would have found that correctional officials were compelling the
plaintiff to make a particular choice, in that case, the choice to in-
criminate himself-if the plaintiff had proven, and the trial court
had found, that the rate of assaults on prisoners was significantly
higher within the maximum-security unit in which he would be
housed if he refused to incriminate himself.
20 1
McKune confirms that the Supreme Court is reticent to find that
confronting inmates with the prospect of being confined in a place
with more austere conditions automatically or generally represents
governmental coercion to make the choice that will enable them to
avoid being subjected to those conditions. But the qualification in
198. Id. at 41.
199. Id. at 51 (O'ConnorJ, concurring).
200. Id.
201. See id. ("Because it is respondent's burden to prove compulsion, we may assume
that the prison is capable of controlling its inmates so that respondent's personal safety is
not jeopardized by being placed in the maximum-security area of the prison, at least in the
absence of proof to the contrary.").
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Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion still leaves unanswered the
question whether a lower victimization rate in a faith-based unit
would effectively coerce inmates to live in those units. The prag-
matic considerations that bear on the resolution of that question in
the Establishment Clause context are discussed below.
ii. Pragmatic Considerations--Concluding that the comparative
safety benefits of living in faith-based units (assuming that there
are such benefits) place undue and unconstitutional pressure on
inmates to choose to live in such units would result in a perverse
irony. One of the purposes of those units, as mentioned earlier,20 2 is
to reduce the violation of prison rules by inmates, making prisons
safer for both inmates and correctional staff. Yet the more effective
faith-based units were in achieving this objective, the more patent
would be their unconstitutionality if statistical differences in assault
rates were equated with governmental coercion. In other words,
the very efficacy of faith-based units from a correctional perspec-
tive would foreordain a finding that they are unconstitutional.
There is nothing in either logic or precedent that would dictate
such a nonsensical result. A high assault rate outside a faith-based
unit could, it is true, be indicative of a constitutional violation in
some circumstances. Prison officials have a constitutional obliga-
tion to meet prisoners' basic safety needs, and the officials'
"deliberate indifference" to a "substantial risk" that inmates in a
non-faith-based unit will be attacked by other inmates violates the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punish-
ments. 20 3 But if prison officials are meeting this constitutional
baseline in protecting inmates from assaults in non-faith-based
units, the fact that assault rates are still lower in faith-based units
would not signify that officials are orchestrating their prison opera-
tions to propel prisoners into requesting an assignment to those
units. 0 4 Instead, and more likely, the lower level of assaults in faith-
based units would be attributable to one or both of two phenom-
ena.
First, prisoners who request an assignment to a faith-based unit
might already be less prone to violence. In this situation, prison offi-
cials would be no more responsible for the less violent proclivities of
202. See supra notes 106-121 and accompanying text.
203. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
204. Cf McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 48 (2002) ("There is ... no indication that the
SATP is merely an elaborate ruse to skirt the protections of the privilege against compelled
self-incrimination.").
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these prisoners than they are for the reduced penchant of female
prisoners to attack other inmates, which results, according to most
studies, in a lower level of inmate-on-inmate assaults in women's
prisons than in men's prisons.0'
Second, fewer assaults in faith-based units might be the by-
product of behavioral changes, perhaps sparked by an internal
spiritual transformation, within prisoners confined in the faith-
based units. But the laudable decision by private individuals (in
this case, prisoners) to refrain from maladaptive behaviors can
hardly be described as governmental coercion. Nor could it be said
to be the proper role of prison officials to refrain from taking ac-
tions that are reasonably related to a legitimate governmental
interest, merely to quell prisoners' spiritual growth.
In short, just because a faith-based program outperforms a non-
faith-based program on certain outcome measures does not mean
that the government is unconstitutionally skewing private choices
whether to participate in the sectarian or secular program. To the
contrary, the decision to participate in the faith-based program
may be wholly voluntary-in Establishment Clause terms, the
product of "true private choice"206--even though the individual
may be naturally inclined to participate in the program that has
proven to be the most effective in meeting certain objectives.
iii. The Import of Zelman v. Simmons-Harris-The Supreme
Court's decision in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris2 0 7 further affirms that
just because a sectarian program offers advantages, even significant
advantages, over its secular counterparts does not eviscerate the
"true private choice" to participate in the religious program that is
a requisite for certain kinds of governmental linkages with that
program to meet the strictures of the Establishment Clause. The
pilot tuition-aid program whose constitutionality was at issue in that
case had been implemented in Cleveland because the city's public-
school system was in shambles. The school district, which had failed
every one of the state's eighteen standards for "minimal acceptable
performance," was in the throes of what auditors described as a "cri-
sis that is perhaps unprecedented in the history of American
education."20° Nine out of ten ninth graders could not pass a basic
proficiency test, and the majority of high-school students never
205. Anthony E. Bottoms, Interpersonal Violence and Social Order in Prison, in PRISONS 234
(Michael Tonry &Joan Petersila eds., 1999).
206. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 653 (2002).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 644.
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graduated . ° Of the minority who did, few could match the aca-
demic performance of students in other cities.20
The state undertook several initiatives to combat this sordid state
of affairs in Cleveland's public schools. For example, the state
started up ten "community schools," which were operated by inde-
pendent school boards, not by the local school district, and also
opened up magnet schools, public schools with a thematic or other
specialty designed to attract students to the schools and improve
the quality of the educational services the students received.21 ' The
state also instituted the tuition-aid program under which state
funds were transferred to participating public and private schools
based on students' enrollment decisions.1 2
In his dissenting opinion in Zelman in which Justices Stevens,
Ginsburg, and Breyer joined, Justice Souter highlighted some of
the deficiencies and drawbacks in the community and magnet
schools that were cited by the majority as viable secular alternatives
to the religious schools to which state funds were being transmitted
when a student elected to attend such a school. Justice Souter
noted, for example, that the students' academic performance was
sub-par in many of the community schools. t 4 Some of the commu-
nity schools also did not offer classes to students in certain grades,
and one of the schools targeted low-performing students with be-
havioral problems, making it, in Justice Souter's words, "not an
attractive 'choice' for most parents."1 5
The majority of the Court, however, refused to be drawn into
this imbroglio in which courts would have to scrutinize secular
schools' curricular offerings, the type of clientele they provide ser-
vices to, statistics on their students' academic performance, and
other variables to ascertain whether governmental officials were
coercing parents to enroll their children in religious schools. In-
stead, the Court simply cited the multiple options from which
parents could choose when deciding whether to send their chil-
dren to a religious school, indicating that the availability of these
options was a relevant criterion factored into its Establishment
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 647-48.
212. Id. at 644-45.
213. Id. at 701 n.9, 702 n.10 (SouterJ., dissenting).
214. Id. at 702 n.10.
215. Id.
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Clause analysis.1 6 In the ensuing discussion, the relevance of secu-
lar alternatives to the constitutionality of governmental funding of
faith-based programs in the prison context is more fully fleshed
out.
iv. The Relevance of Secular Alternatives to the Constitutionality of
Faith-Based Prison Units-Unlike the parents in Zelman who could
select from a range of secular alternatives when deciding whether
to send their children to a religious school whose expenses would
then be defrayed by a government subsidy, prisoners confronted
with the opportunity to be placed in a faith-based unit generally
would not have an array of secular alternative placements from
which to choose. Prisoners, not surprisingly, do not normally de-
cide in which prison they will be incarcerated or in which part of a
particular prison they will be confined. 217 Those decisions are in-
stead made by correctional officials based on a number of factors,
including security considerations, resource constraints, and in-
mates' programming, medical-care, and other needs. Prisoners, in
short, generally live where prison officials tell them to live.
But the fact that prisoners often might be presented with only
two choices regarding their housing assignment-either be placed,
for example, in the general-population unit of a minimum-security
prison or be housed in the faith-based unit at that prison-does
not mean that a prisoner's decision to live in a faith-based unit is
the end-product of governmental coercion. The conundrum faced
by prisoners deciding whether to be confined in a prison's protec-
tive-custody unit affirms the verity of this conclusion.
Confinement in a prison's general-population unit can pose
augmented hazards for certain inmates, such as those who are
young and slightly built (making them more likely targets for sex-
ual and other physical assaults) and those with known enemies
from rival gangs housed in that unit.21 Those dangers can be
averted, or at least diminished, through confinement in a protec-
tive-custody unit, where prisoners are isolated from the general
216. Those options included attending the public schools, with or without the tutorial
aid now offered within those schools, attending a community school, attending a magnet
school, or enrolling in a secular private school to which a state tuition subsidy would be
transmitted. Id. at 655.
217. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983) (concluding that a prison sentence,
as a general rule, implicitly authorizes the prisoner's transfer to any part of a prison, includ-
ing a unit with more draconian conditions); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976)
(observing that a state has the power to confine a prisoner in any of its prisons).
218. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, No ESCAPE: MALE RAPE IN U.S. PRISONS (2001), avail-
able at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/prison/report4.html (on file with the University
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
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population. Prisoners who want to be confined in, and meet the
eligibility criteria for confinement in, the protective-custody unit,
however, face the proverbial "Hobson's choice." If they remain in
the general-population unit, they may be assaulted, raped, or even
killed. But if they are transferred, at their request, to the protec-
tive-custody unit, their freedom of movement will be curtailed
dramatically. Prisoners in protective-custody units are often con-
fined in their cells up to twenty-three hours a day, and their work
opportunities and access to educational, vocational-training, and
other programs are reduced significantly.219 Thus, prisoners decid-
ing whether to request or accept an assignment to protective
custody frequently face a wrenching choice-a choice between en-
hanced safety, on the one hand, and more expansive freedom and
privileges, on the other.
Nonetheless, courts have generally not found that differences in
the conditions in the protective-custody and general-population
units make a prisoner's decision to be placed in one of those units
involuntary, provided, of course, that the conditions in both units,
though perhaps harsh, are not unconstitutional.220 In other words,
the fact that a prisoner may face a difficult choice between two al-
ternative, even unpalatable, housing assignments does not vitiate
the inmate's freedom to choose.
If, as the courts have held, the diminished freedom and privi-
leges enjoyed by prisoners confined in protective custody do not
unconstitutionally coerce them to opt for a placement in general
population, it is difficult to envision how the differences that one
would normally expect to find between a faith-based unit and a
non-faith-based unit would nullify the validity of the choice made
by a prisoner to live in a faith-based unit.22' The Establishment
219. For descriptions of the conditions that typically prevail in protective-custody units,
see Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 E2d 397, 403 n.7 (11th Cir. 1986), and Graham v. Perez, 121 E
Supp. 2d 317, 323 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
220. See, e.g., Harding v. Jones, 768 F. Supp. 275, 277-78 (E.D. Mo. 1991) (holding that
the plaintiffs decision to remain in the general prison population rather than be confined
in the protective-custody unit was "voluntary" even though an inmate with whom he had an
ongoing dispute was also confined in the general-population unit). Cf Zatler, 802 E2d at 403
(concluding that prison officials did not act with reckless disregard for the plaintiffs need
for protection when the plaintiff had failed to request an assignment to the protective-
custody unit, whose conditions, though harsh, were constitutional).
221. Of course, as alluded to earlier, if conditions in the secular unit were so inhumane
that they violated the Eight Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments,
the "choice" whether or not to remain in that unit would be ephemeral-in short, not a real
choice when viewed from the perspective of a reasonable person presented with the oppor-
tunity to escape such barbaric and potentially life-threatening conditions. For an example of
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Clause does not require, nor could courts realistically expect, that
the conditions in a faith-based unit exactly mirror those in the
general-population unit, the most likely secular alternative to a
placement in the faith-based unit. Faith-based units, as their name
suggests, are inherently different from other prison units. Faith-
based units, like prison chaplaincy services, are mechanisms for
delivering religious-programming services to prisoners, and reli-
gious precepts will often permeate the day-to-day programming
within the units as well as informal interactions with staff. To de-
mand uniformity in the conditions in faith-based and non-faith-
based units in order for a prisoner's decision to be confined in a
faith-based unit to be considered uncoerced is to demand, in the
end, the impossible.
Supreme Court pronouncements on the scope of prisoners'
rights to religious freedom under the First Amendment's Free Ex-
ercise Clause provide further, though indirect, support for the
proposition that a prisoner's decision to reside in a faith-based unit
can be the end result of the "true private choice" required by the
Establishment Clause even though prison officials present the in-
mate with only one alternative housing assignment from which to
choose and that alternative has some downsides not shared by the
faith-based unit. In Cruz v. Beto, the Supreme Court observed that
prison officials do not contravene the Free Exercise Clause when
they afford inmates who are adherents of more prevalent religions
with access to a state-provided chaplain of their faith while refusing
to provide inmates from minority religious sects with access to a
state-paid chaplain from their religious sect.223 The Court under-
scored that prisoners do not have to be offered "identical"
opportunities to practice their religion, such as similar facilities or
personnel support, in order for those opportunities to be consid-
ered "reasonable" and "comparable" to those afforded inmates of
other faiths. 4
Similarly, one might argue that a non-faith-based unit is a "rea-
sonable" alternative to a faith-based unit and a "comparable"
housing and programming assignment for Establishment Clause
such conditions, see Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 682-84, 687 (1978) (holding that prison-
ers who were fed less than 1000 calories a day and were confined in filthy 8' x 10' cells with
up to four and sometimes as many as eleven other prisoners, many of whom were assaultive,
were subjected to cruel and unusual punishment).
222. In addition, were faith-based units essentially carbon copies of non-faith-based
units, the very reasons for establishing faith-based units in the first place would be under-
mined.
223. 405 U.S. 319, 322 n.2 (1972).
224. Id. at 322 n.2.
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purposes, even though the non-faith-based unit is dissimilar from
the faith-based unit and provides prisoners less extensive support
services. Indeed, it would seem incongruent were courts to adopt a
lax interpretation of what constitutes a "reasonable" and "compa-
rable" opportunity for a prisoner to exercise his or her religious
freedom for free-exercise purposes and then adopt a narrow and
constrictive definition of what constitutes a "reasonable" and
"comparable" opportunity to refrain from participating in a reli-
gious program in the Establishment Clause context.
225
In sum, an inmate's decision to live in a faith-based unit would
not invariably, or even usually, be the end result of proscribed gov-
ernmental compulsion even though the alternative housing option
proffered the inmate is, in some respects, inferior to the faith-
based unit. However, even in the absence of such compulsion,
faith-based units might still transgress constitutional boundaries if
prison officials failed to meet another requirement of the Estab-
lishment Clause. That requirement is discussed below.
b. The Governmental Neutrality Requirement--One theme permeat-
ing the Supreme Court cases defining the contours of the
Establishment Clause is that the government must be neutral when
dispensing funds whose beneficiaries include religious groups, or-
ganizations, or institutions.225 The Supreme Court is still grappling
with questions concerning the meaning of this neutrality require-
ment 27 and the way in which these questions should be resolved
225. In O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987), the Supreme Court also adopted
a very loose definition of what constitutes a viable alternative for exercising an alleged reli-
gious right when the Court applied the Turner test to the claim of certain Muslim prisoners
that prison regulations that effectively barred their participation in Jumu'ah violated their
First Amendment right to freely exercise their religion. In examining in that case whether
the prisoner-plaintiffs had "'alternative means of exercising the right"' in question, the
Court underscored that they had not been "deprived of all forms of religious exercise." Id. at
351-52 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90 (1987)). While the plaintiffs could not
attend Jumu'ah, the religious service in which they wanted to participate, they could, for
example, meet with a state-paid imam and celebrate Ramadan, a month marked by prayer
and fasting. Id. at 352. O'Lone provides additional, though once again more tangential, sup-
port for the postulate that the operations of, and conditions within, secular alternatives to
faith-based units need not exactly or even largely parallel those in the faith-based unit to
comport with First Amendment requirements.
226. This neutrality requirement has been profiled in recent cases in which the Court
upheld the constitutionality of transmitting certain pecuniary benefits or other governmen-
tal aid to religious, in addition to nonreligious, schools. See the cases cited in note 162,
supfra.
227. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002) (emphasizing that
tuition-aid program was "neutral" towards religion, while at the same time noting that the
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outside the prison context is beyond the scope of this Article. But
in a correctional setting, it is evident that "neutrality" means, at a
minimum, two things: first, that the government cannot signify that
it favors faith-based units and the prisoners confined within them
or, conversely, secular units and the prisoners residing in them;
and second, that the government (as opposed to inmates) cannot
evince a preference for one kind of religious sect over another
when making decisions regarding the structuring of faith-based
* 2281
units.
One can envision a number of ways in which prison officials
might abridge this neutrality requirement. First, if prison officials
were to affirmatively counsel prisoners to request a placement in a
faith-based unit or to refrain from making such a request, their
recommendations could potentially represent an abandonment of
the requisite position of neutrality on the question of whether
prisoners should or should not avail themselves of religious pro-
gramming opportunities at the prison. 9 Second, if prisoners faced
the prospect of either a shortened or lengthened term of confine-
ment if housed in the faith-based unit, the discrepant treatment of
prisoners would be an overt indicator of governmental non-
neutrality between religion and irreligions.2 3 Thus, offering prison-
ers in faith-based units more or fewer good-time credits or earlier
aid was funneled directly to parents, who then endorsed the checks over to the schools of
their choice).
228. Cf Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982) ("The clearest command of the Es-
tablishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over
another.").
229. But see Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., v. McCallum, 324 F.3d 880 (7th
Cir. 2003), a case in which the Seventh Circuit upheld the constitutionality of a privately
operated halfway house with a programming emphasis on Christianity. Although a parole
officer could recommend that an offender request a placement in the halfway house, the
officer could not mandate such a placement even if the placement were deemed to be in the
offender's best interests. Id. at 881. In addition, a parole officer would not tender this kind
of recommendation to an offender if he was not a Christian or otherwise interested in relig-
ion. Id. at 882. The officer also explained to the offender that the halfway house had a
Christian theme, underscored that the officer's recommendation was not binding, and of-
fered a secular alternative placement to the offender. Id. at 881-82.
230. Such variable treatment of prisoners because of their religious convictions or lack
of such convictions would also likely render a prisoner's decision to opt for or against a
housing assignment to the faith-based unit involuntary. Cf McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 38
(2002) (noting, in support of its conclusion that prison officials were not unconstitutionally
compelling the prisoner-plaintiff to incriminate himself, that the prisoner's refusal to par-
ticipate in the sex-offender treatment program would not extend the length of his sentence
or adversely affect his eligibility for good-time credits or parole release). See also Sandin v.
Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 487 (1995) (citing the fact that the prisoner-plaintiff's confinement in
disciplinary segregation would not "inevitably affect the duration of his sentence" in support
of the Court's conclusion that the confinement did not deprive the plaintiff of the "liberty"
that triggers due-process safeguards).
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or later parole release than their counterparts in non-faith-based
units would clearly contravene the Establishment Clause.
Third, prison officials would walk on treacherous ground, and
invite an Establishment Clause challenge, were they to exclude in-
mates of certain faiths (or no faith) from participating in a faith-
based unit. The adoption and application by governmental officials
of what would be, in effect, a kind of religious litmus test that must
be met before inmates could be considered eligible to live in the
faith-based unit would not be consonant with the neutrality princi-
ple embodied within the Establishment Clause. (Nor would a
policy of exclusivity comport with the practical reality that indi-
viduals' religious and spiritual beliefs evolve and change over time
and that it is not uncommon for people who adhere to one set of
religious beliefs to convert to another religion.) By making adher-
ence or nonadherence to a particular religion an entry
requirement for admission into a faith-based unit, prison officials
would not only be according preferential treatment to prisoners of
certain faiths but would be assuming the role of religious gate-
keepers, who could open or close "the gate" to the unit based on
their or their surrogates' assessment of prisoners' religious scruples
and convictions.
While the above three constraints on the operation of faith-
based units are, in this author's opinion, core ingredients of the
Establishment Clause's neutrality requirement, contracting with a
private group or entity to operate such units raises other questions
concerning the scope of the neutrality requirement whose answers
are more difficult to discern. One of those questions is whether a
request for proposals (RFP) can limit submissions to groups affili-
ated with certain religions. The visceral response to that question is
that an RFP that essentially said, "Christians only should apply" or
"Only applications from Muslim organizations are welcome" would
be perceived by the "reasonable observer" as governmental favorit-
ism towards one set of religious beliefs..2 3' This overt favoritism
would, at least as a general rule, clearly flout the Establishment
Clause's command that the government be neutral, and take rea-
sonable measures to appear neutral, on religious matters.
There is, however, a potential exception to this general rule. The
Supreme Court has instructed that when determining whether
231. In determining whether a governmental program impermissibly endorses religion,
the Supreme Court has assessed the program from the perspective of a "reasonable ob-
server." See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 655 (2002).
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governmental connections with religion impermissibly foster the
"public perception" that the government is endorsing certain reli-
gious beliefs and practices, the "reasonable observer" is to be
charged with an understanding of the "history and context" of the
program whose constitutionality has been contested.2 2 Thus, the
overall context in which a faith-based unit is established and oper-
ated would need to be considered when assessing whether a
predetermined decision that a unit will be a locus for Christian,
Muslim, Native-American, or some other kind of religious pro-
gramming violates constitutional strictures. And it might be that in
some limited contexts, restricting the submission of proposals to
groups that will provide services designed primarily to meet the
needs of inmates of a particular faith group would not violate the
Establishment Clause.
For example, assume that a state's department of corrections
adopts a comprehensive religious-programming plan to accommo-
date the religious needs of its prisoners. As part of this plan, which
will provide a continuum of services for inmates, three pilot, faith-
based units will be established, one geared primarily for Native-
American inmates, one for Muslim prisoners, and one for Chris-
tian inmates. These three religions represent the religions to which
most inmates in the state's prison population say they adhere or in
which they have expressed an interest. When viewed in isolation,
the RFP for any one of these units-for example, the RFP soliciting
applications to operate the Native-American unit-might appear to
unconstitutionally cast the government's imprimatur on one par-
ticular religion. Yet when viewed in context, as part of the broader
framework for expanding the opportunities for prisoners to exer-
cise their religious freedom and to learn about other religious
faiths, the RFP containing a faith-based criterion would signify, not
a policy of religious exclusivity, but one of inclusiveness, though
admittedly one in keeping with the Supreme Court's acknowledg-
ment that prison officials need not expend (nor could they afford
to expend) the resources to provide inmates of multitudinous
faiths with identical religious programming opportunities.
Another question concerning the meaning of the Establishment
Clause's neutrality requirement is whether it is abridged when the
criteria delineated in an RFP as a precondition to the dissemina-
tion of government funds can only be met by one or a small
handful of the diverse array of religious sects. Once again, this
232. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
233. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 n.2 (1972).
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question cannot be fully answered in a factual vacuum. If, for ex-
ample, the RFP was drafted not to reflect the level of demand for
certain kinds of religious services by prisoners, but instead to con-
form with the religious predilections of prison officials, a violation
of the Establishment Clause would likely ensue. 34
On the other hand, just because there may be few candidates
that can currently meet an RFP's terms does necessarily mean that
prison officials are violating, or even attempting to circumvent, the
constitutional prohibition on governmental "establishment of re-
ligion." To the contrary, Supreme Court caselaw confirms that a
governmental aid program may transmit a disproportionate
amount of funds to one particular religious sect without contraven-
ing the Establishment Clause. For example, in Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris, it was irrelevant to the Court that Catholic schools would
receive the lion's share of the tuition aid funneled to private reli-
gious schools due to the simple fact that Catholics have long opted
to establish, operate, and financially support parochial schools,
more so than most other religions in this country. Similarly, if a
provider of religious services has already manifested a strong
commitment to ministering to inmates and is thus more likely to
respond to an RFP soliciting proposals for the operation of a faith-
based unit, the likelihood that this provider may be one of only a
few applicants, or perhaps the only applicant, to operate the unit
would not disqualify the provider from receiving the government
funds earmarked to accommodate the programming interests and
preferences of the inmates who have applied for admission into
the unit.
Another unanswered question concerning the meaning of the
Establishment Clause's neutrality requirement in the prison con-
text is whether the government can underwrite the costs of
providing religious services to inmates in the faith-based unit, in
addition to security, medical-care, and other nonsectarian services.
The government might pay for the religious-programming costs in
at least one of two ways-by contracting for those services with a
private provider or by hiring personnel to provide those services.
The question raised is an important one, because without govern-
mental assumption of the responsibility to pay all or most of these
234. Cf Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W3d 171, 191-92 (Tex. 2001) (holding that jail's faith-
based unit that sheriff directed be operated in accordance with the "orthodox Christian
biblical principles" to which he subscribed violated the Establishment Clause).
235. 536 U.S. 639, 681 (2002) (Thomas,J., concurring).
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programming costs, faith-based units will be a rarity in prisons
across the country. Providers of religious services at this point gen-
erally do not have the resources that would enable them to pay the
programming costs of operating more than a smattering of faith-
based units. 6
Individuals who contend that direct governmental funding of re-
ligious programming in faith-based units violates the Establishment
Clause would undoubtedly cite the caveat repeated by the Supreme
Court in some cases upholding the constitutionality of various pro-
grams in which governmental aid was transmitted to religious
groups or organizations, typically religious schools-that the aid
was not being used to proselytize but was being used for a secular
purpose only, such as to teach children math or English. 7 By con-
trast, proselytization will typically be one of the hallmarks of a faith-
based prison unit. Of course, the inner workings of faith-based
units could be described in more banal terms in an effort to ward
off an Establishment Clause challenge to their institution. For ex-
ample, it could be said, and accurately so, that faith-based units are
designed to enable prisoners to explore their spirituality or, con-
versely, their lack of spirituality and to decide for themselves the
significance, if any, that religion has and will have in their lives. But
this verbal sleight of hand would not alter what happens and would
most likely continue to happen in faith-based units, particularly if
they are to significantly further the legitimate governmental objec-
tives for which they were established. Prisoners would be
encouraged to consider what is professed to be the reality of God's,
Yahweh's, Allah's, or some other Supreme Being's existence; to
recognize and appreciate the depth of God's love for them; and to
be transformed by their newfound understanding of their relation-
ship with God in a way that affects, for the better, the way in which
they conduct their day-to-day lives. In short, the proselytization of
prisoners would be interwoven, though perhaps seamlessly, into
the operation of faith-based units.
But those who would adduce from some prior Supreme Court
cases an across-the-board, no-proselytization rule would be
236. Prison Fellowship has reported that it incurs $600,000 in programming costs to
enable two hundred inmates to participate in the InnerChange Freedom Initiative for an
eighteen-month period. See PRISON FELLOWSHIP, A STRATEGIC PLAN TO REDUCE CRIME
THROUGH A PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP TO EXPAND THE INNERCHANGE FREEDOM INITIA-
TIVE 16 (2000).
237. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234 (1997) (upholding program under
which public school teachers provided remedial education in parochial schools, in part
because the aid did not lead to "governmental indoctrination").
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overlooking the unique environs in which a faith-based unit would
operate-a prison. As mentioned earlier, because the government
is responsible for isolating prisoners from the outside world, the
government can, and in some instances must, take affirmative steps
to dissipate the deleterious effects of incarceration on prisoners.238
Thus, while the government could not normally hire chaplains to
preach and otherwise minister to nonprisoners without impinging
upon the Establishment Clause, the Constitution permits the
government to hire chaplains, whether as employees or
independent contractors, to provide religious services to inmates.230
If it is constitutional for the government to pay for chaplains to
help meet the religious needs of prisoners, it is difficult to envision
how providing prisoners with a greater range of options from
which to choose when they are deciding how their own spiritual
needs can best be met would betray a lack of neutrality on the part
of the government on religious matters. On the contrary, one
might argue that, at least sometimes, the reticence of prison offi-
cials to even explore the policy implications of expanding
religious-programming options for prisoners by making faith-based
units available to them reflects antipathy, not neutrality, towards
religion, particularly when officials have made a concerted effort in
other programming areas, such as education, vocational training,
and substance-abuse treatment, to tailor those programs to meet
the varied needs of prisoners. 4 °
Thus, the Establishment Clause's neutrality requirement has,
and must have, a different meaning in the prison context than it
has outside the confines of a prison. This conclusion is certainly in
keeping with the Supreme Court's declaration that "neutrality"
within the meaning of another First Amendment provision, the
Free Speech Clause, means something very different when the
concept is being applied to restrictions on prisoners', as opposed
238. For example, prison officials must take steps to ensure that prisoners have "'a rea-
sonably adequate opportunity to present claimed violations of fundamental constitutional
rights to the courts,'" despite their incarceration. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996)
(quoting Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825 (1977)).
239. See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
240. In some circumstances, though, other considerations, such as cost and institu-
tional-security concerns or uncertainty about the constraints the Establishment Clause
places on the operation of faith-based units, might account for the failure of prison officials
to delve deeply into the question whether faith-based units should be incorporated into the
correctional system.
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to nonprisoners', asserted right to freedom of speech. 4' In addi-
tion, this conclusion averts what would otherwise be an
irreconcilable conflict in some instances between prisoners' right
to exercise religious freedom and their corresponding right to be
insulated from a governmental "establishment of religion."
II. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AVERTING ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
CHALLENGES TO FAITH-BASED PRISON UNITS
While the Establishment Clause does not pose an insuperable
barrier to the establishment and operation of faith-based prison
units funded in whole or large part by the government, the units
will, as have other cutting-edge correctional innovations, undoubt-
edly spark an intense constitutional and policy debate until the
units become commonplace across the country.4' In order to avert
constitutional challenges to faith-based prison units and to prevail
when such challenges are mounted against the units, there are
steps that correctional officials can and should take when planning
and operating those units. Some of the more critically important
steps are outlined below:
1. Provide prisoners with detailed information, communicated both in
writing and verbally, about the faith-based unit or units. Prison officials
may offer prisoners the option of being housed'in a faith-based
unit at different junctures during their period of confinement.
Some correctional systems may allow prisoners to move directly
into a faith-based unit from the reception center, where prisoners
are processed when first entering the prison system. Other systems
may restrict admission to a faith-based unit until prisoners have
been incarcerated a specified period of time, have reached a de-
fined point before their potential or expected release date from
241. See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407, 415-16 (1989) (concluding that while
governmental censorship of publications "would raise grave First Amendment concerns
outside the prison context," the regulations authorizing the censorship of publications re-
ceived by prisoners were "'neutral' in the technical sense in which we meant and used that
term in Turner").
242. The "privatization" of prisons--the contracting with private companies to operate
prisons-sparked a national outcry and debate in the 1980s. See Ira P. Robbins, Privatization
of Corrections: Defining the Issues, 69 JUDICATURE 324, 326 (1986). By 2002, thirty-one states
and the federal Bureau of Prisons reported housing inmates in privately-run correctional
facilities. PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLENJ. BECK, BUREAU OFJUST. STAT. BULL., PRISONERS IN
2002, at 6 (U.S. Dep't ofJustice, 2003) (noting that private correctional facilities held 5.8%
of state prisoners and 12.4% of federal prisoners at yearend 2002).
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prison, or have reached some other benchmark during their incar-
ceration.
At whatever point prisoners are offered the choice of being
placed in or transferred to a faith-based unit, prison officials
should explain, both verbally and in writing, the way in which the
faith-based unit is structured and operates. These explanations
should be in terms that are clear and understandable to prisoners,
the majority of whom have deficient reading skills.2 43 Among other
information relayed to the prisoners, they should be apprised of
the following:
* That inmates of all faiths or no faith are eligible for
a placement in or transfer to a faith-based unit, as
long as they meet all other eligibility criteria, such
as custody level, for such a placement.
0 That an inmate can be housed in a faith-based unit
only if the inmate wants and requests such a place-
ment and the inmate has confirmed that his or her
decision to be placed in a faith-based unit is a vol-
untary one.
* That the prisoner's decision to either request or not
request an assignment to a faith-based unit will have
no effect on the length of time the prisoner is in-
carcerated, including the accumulation of good-
time credits or the prisoner's parole-release date in
a state in which a parole system is in place.
* That the inmate's decision to either request or not
request an assignment to a faith-based unit will have
no effect on the inmate's classification level (privi-
lege status) or on the security level at which the
inmate is confined.
* That the establishment and operation of the faith-
based unit and the operation of non-faith-based
units reflect neither an endorsement nor disap-
proval by the government or governmental officials
of any particular kind of religion, religion in gen-
eral, agnosticism, or atheism.
243. A study conducted by the National Center for Education Statistics found that seven
out of every ten inmates perform at the lowest literacy levels. KARL O. HAIGLER ET AL., U.S.
DEP'T OF EDUC., LrTERAcY BEHIND PRISON WALLS: PROFILES OF THE PRISON POPULATION
FROM THE NATIONAL ADULT LITERACY SURVEY, xviii, 17-19 (1994).
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That the faith-based unit is designed to give prison-
ers a greater range of options from which to choose
as they determine how their spiritual needs, if any,
can best be met during the period of their con-
finement.
* That religious programs and services will still be
available to prisoners who prefer to be housed in
the non-faith-based units but also wish to avail
themselves of such programs and services.
* That the prisoner will not be penalized in any way if
the inmate initially decides to live in a faith-based
unit but later changes his or her mind.
2. Ensure that inmates who want to be assigned to a faith-based unit
sign a written form requesting this housing assignment. If, after being
provided with detailed information regarding a faith-based unit
and its secular alternative or alternatives, an inmate indicates that
he or she wants to be housed in a faith-based unit, the inmate
should be asked to read and sign a form denominated, "Request
for Assignment to a Faith-Based Unit" or words to that effect. The
essential point is that the form should not be entitled a "Consent
Form," a title which arguably suggests the prison officials have en-
treated the prisoner to agree to be transferred to the faith-based
unit and the prisoner has succumbed to their overtures. Instead,
the form should confirm with unmistakable clarity that after being
informed about both non-faith-based and faith-based program-
ming and housing options, it is the prisoner, not a prison official or
some other third party, who is initiating the request for a place-
ment in the faith-based unit.
The request form to be signed and dated by the inmate should
attest that the inmate has been provided, both orally and in writ-
ing, with detailed information about the faith-based unit and its
non-faith-based counterparts; that the inmate has had an opportu-
nity to ask questions about those units; that the prisoner is
requesting of his or her own free will to be placed in the faith-
based unit; that the prisoner has not been ordered, coerced, or
pressured in any way by any governmental official or any other per-
son affiliated with the faith-based program or correctional system
to request this assignment; and that no governmental official or
person affiliated with the faith-based program or correctional sys-
tem has recommended that the inmate tender this request. Before
the inmate signs the request form, its contents should be read to
the inmate, and the person who recited its provisions to the inmate
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should certify to this recitation and to the fact that the inmate
signed the request form in his or her presence.
3. Adopt policies and training protocols designed to ensure that faith-
based units conform with the Establishment Clause's voluntariness and
neutrality requirements. When consistent with the legitimate govern-
mental objectives for which a faith-based unit was established, the
policies that govern the administration of faith-based units should
generally mirror those applied to prisoners housed elsewhere at a
security level comparable to that of the faith-based unit. For exam-
ple, conduct that would lead to the imposition of disciplinary
sanctions on a prisoner confined in the general prison population
should also evoke sanctions when the maladaptive conduct occurs
in the faith-based unit. Such parallel treatment of prisoners,
whether they are inside or outside the faith-based unit, will help to
obviate any perceived coercive pressures on inmates to opt for a
placement in a faith-based unit or, conversely, in a non-faith-based
unit. Avoiding substantially dissimilar treatment of prisoners in
faith- and non-faith-based units, except when the differential
treatment is reasonably related to the legitimate governmental in-
terests that the faith-based unit is intended to further, will also
serve as an indicator of the government's neutrality on religious
matters.
Obviously, prison officials will have to draft some additional
policies that bear on the operation of what is, in effect, a special-
ized unit. Some supplementary policies will be especially important
in advancing the goals of neutrality and noncoerciveness in the
institution and operation of faith-based units, including the follow-
ing: First, any policies related to the faith-based unit should
include a disclaimer denoting the fact that the government's ef-
forts, through the faith-based unit and other religious programs
and services, to meet the religious needs and interests of individu-
als whom it has incarcerated does not signify that it is endorsing or
disavowing any discrete religion, religion in general, agnosticism,
or atheism.
Second, a policy statement should cite the legitimate govern-
mental interests that are propelling the establishment of the faith-
based unit. The statement might, for example, refer to the gov-
ernment's interest in determining, through a pilot project or series
of pilot projects, the extent to which faith-based units can curb re-
cidivism, reduce institutional-security problems, or advance the
secular goals of restorative justice. The policy statement should also
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refer to the government's valid interest in accommodating in-
mates' religious interests and needs when such accommodation
does not conflict with other legitimate governmental interests,
such as the preservation of institutional security. The policy state-
ment's description of the faith-based unit's purposes should be
drafted with great care to avoid any language that could be inter-
preted or misinterpreted as governmental endorsement of religion
or of one particular religious sect.
244
Third, a policy should specifically outline the selection criteria
that a prisoner must meet in order to be admitted into the faith-
based unit. The policy statement should underscore that inmates
of all religions as well as nonadherents of religion can apply for
admission into the unit and that affiliation or lack of affiliation
with a particular religion or religious denomination is not a sine
qua non for admission.245 When there are more applicants for ad-
mission to a faith-based unit than there are available spots in the
unit, the policy statement should describe the process that will be
followed in determining who will be assigned to the unit. That
process should be structured to ensure that an inmate's religious
convictions or lack thereof do not foreclose admission into the
unit.
Fourth, the policy statement should specify the circumstances
that will lead to a prisoner's removal from the faith-based unit,
such as commission by a prisoner of certain kinds of disciplinary
infractions, or a prisoner's request for a transfer out of the unit.
This portion of the policy statement should emphasize that a pris-
oner's agreement or disagreement with the religious tenets to
which others within the unit subscribe will not be grounds for ex-
pulsion of the inmate from the unit.
4. Limit, to the extent possible, disparities between the conditions in a
non-faith-based unit and its faith-based alternative. As discussed earlier
in this Article, Supreme Court caselaw strongly suggests that condi-
tions in a faith-based unit can differ, even significantly so, from
244. For an example of one government document containing language that might be
so misinterpreted, see TDCJ Report, supra note 122, at 2 (noting that the "program compo-
nents" of the faith-based unit "address the 'restorative justice' model, that is, the offender's
restoring of himself to his family, his community, his victims, to himself and ultimately to
God").
245. For security and other legitimate penological reasons, prison officials could, how-
ever, require that the faith-based unit be comprised of inmates from diverse faith groups.
Prison officials might decide, for example, to establish a pluralistic, faith-based unit in order
to avoid the creation of "affinity groups" that might challenge the authority of prison offi-
cials and jeopardize institutional security. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 353
(1987).
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those within its non-faith-based counterpart without compromising
the voluntariness of a prisoner's decision to be housed or not
housed in a faith-based unit. When those differences are attribut-
able to legitimate security or other penological concerns or
physical-plant variations that would be cost-prohibitive to elimi-
nate, the differing conditions also do not signify governmental
non-neutrality either for or against religion.
At the same time, palpable differences between the conditions
in a non-faith-based unit and those in its faith-based alternative will
likely invite Establishment Clause challenges, even though those
challenges may prove non-meritorious. To ward off the filing of
such lawsuits, prison officials should therefore eliminate, to the
extent possible, differences between the conditions in the two
kinds of units. And where it is not feasible, due to cost, security,
programmatic, or other reasons, for particular conditions in a
faith-based unit to correspond with those in the non-faith-based
unit, prison officials should document the legitimate governmental
interests that foreclose the duplication of conditions in the two
units.
5. Optimally, prison officials should contract, through a competitive bid-
ding process, with private individuals or entities to provide religious
services to prisoners in faith-based units. The Establishment Clause
clearly does not erect a per se bar on the hiring of employees by the
government to provide religious services to inmates. Otherwise,
prison chaplaincy programs across the country would be unconsti-
tutional. In many ways, faith-based units are simply an extension of
these chaplaincy programs. But instead of faith-based services be-
ing rendered to an inmate by one individual for, at most, a few
hours a month, several individuals provide those services for much
or most of each day.
While prison chaplaincy programs are an indicator that the
Establishment Clause permits prison chaplains and perhaps other
governmental employees to provide ecclesiastical or other relig-
iously oriented services to prisoners in faith-based units in at least
some circumstances, the parameters of the Establishment Clause in
the prison setting are still unclear. In this uncertain constitutional
climate, it might therefore be prudent for prison officials to erect a
buffer between the government and the direct providers of reli-
gious services in the faith-based unit to further guard against any
misperception that the faith-based unit is a mechanism for reli-
gious indoctrination by the government. One way to construct
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such a barrier is to contract with private providers, whether indi-
viduals or entities, to provide religious services to inmates confined
in the faith-based unit. Of course, that raises the question as to
what constitute the "religious services" that should be provided, at
least largely, by individuals who are not governmental employees if
the effort to stave off Establishment Clause claims asserted against
faith-based units is to prove successful. Since the Supreme Court
has yet to fully flesh out the contours of the Establishment Clause
in the correctional context, prison officials would be well-advised
to err on the side of caution when resolving this question. Thus, if
the encouragement of inmates to assess the decisions they have
made or are making from a spiritual perspective or to apply a reli-
gious framework to some other subject is a feature of a traditionally
secular program, such as life-skills training or substance-abuse
treatment, it would be preferable if that program were staffed by
nongovernmental employees.
6. The operations of a faith-based unit should be monitored and evalu-
ated to ensure compliance with the Establishment Clause's voluntariness
and neutrality requirements. Even when a prison unit is generally op-
erating in conformance with constitutional requirements, there
may be times when an individual employee engages in aberrant
behavior, in contravention of prison policies, that violates the Con-
stitution. For example, even though the humane treatment of
prisoners may be an ingrained professional norm in a particular
prison, a maverick correctional officer may flout this norm and
batter a prisoner, in violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibi-
tion of cruel and unusual punishments.
Because of the inevitability of human fallibility, prison officials
can and should put evaluation mechanisms in place to unearth po-
tential constitutional problems, including Establishment Clause
violations, in the operation of a prison. Prison officials can, for ex-
ample, monitor the grievances filed by prisoners housed in faith-
based units or administer surveys to those prisoners to detect any
signs of slippage in adherence to the Establishment Clause's volun-
tariness and neutrality requirements. The officials can then
undertake ameliorative measures, such as augmented training,
when needed, to avert the recurrence of isolated instances of ar-
guably unconstitutional conduct by individuals connected with the
faith-based program.
Some correctional officials might protest that the results of these
monitoring and evaluation processes might be used against them
in a lawsuit, providing ammunition to those who, because of their
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misconstruction of the Establishment Clause or hostility towards
religion, oppose the establishment of faith-based prison units. But
in fact, the visible efforts of prison officials to avert violations of the
Establishment Clause and to ferret out violations of that constitu-
tional provision should provide tangible evidence of the
government's compliance with the Establishment Clause's neutral-
ity requirement, serving as a manifestation of the government's
commitment to both being and appearing neutral with regard to
an inmate's decision whether to be housed in a non-faith-based or
faith-based unit. In addition, these and other evaluation mecha-
nisms can be helpful in identifying and eradicating coercive
pressures that some prisoners may perceive are being exerted on
them to request a placement in a faith-based unit. This overt gov-
ernmental responsiveness in quelling such coercive pressures
should itself reaffirm to prisoners that their decision to be housed
in a faith-based unit must be voluntary, as they were indeed told
when being apprised of their non-faith-based and faith-based hous-
ing options. In short, these evaluation processes should, if
constructed appropriately, avert lawsuits alleging that prisoners are
being coerced into choosing an assignment to a faith-based unit.
III. CONCLUSION
In a long line of Supreme Court cases, the Court has consistently
interpreted the rights of prisoners differently from those of non-
prisoners. Mindful of the daunting challenges prison officials face
in operating a prison safely and securely and of the difficulty of
achieving the crime-control objectives of incarceration, the Court
in the past has almost obsequiously deferred to the judgment of
prison officials regarding the permissible encroachments on what,
outside the prison context, would be constitutional rights. Prison
officials can, for example, forbid prisoners from corresponding or
meeting with certain persons,246 can censor what prisoners read, 47
and can prohibit them from attending a worship service that con-
flicts with institutional security or other penological needs.248 At the
same time, because the government is responsible for having iso-
246. Shaw %'. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 231 (2001); Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v.
Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 93 (1987).
247. Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 419 (1989).
248. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 353 (1987).
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lated prisoners from the outside world, governmental officials can
take steps to dissipate the effects of that isolation that they could
not take constitutionally outside the correctional realm. For exam-
ple, prison officials can hire chaplains to meet the spiritual needs
of prisoners even though the Establishment Clause would gener-
ally, though not always, bar government-paid chaplaincy services in
the free world.
It is against this backdrop that the constitutionality of faith-based
prison units must be assessed. The Supreme Court has stated un-
equivocally that courts are to apply the Turner test when
adjudicating any prisoner's claim that impedes "the needs of
prison administration.", 49 Faith-based units clearly implicate, or to
invoke the nomenclature of the Turner test, have a "rational con-
nection" to: such needs, including the need to achieve
incarceration's crime-control objectives, to preserve institutional
security, to further the aims of restorative justice, and to accom-
modate prisoners' right to religious freedom and their religious
needs in a way that reflects the diversity of those needs. And, as is
usually the case when courts apply the Turner test to a prisoner's
constitutional claim, faith-based units pass constitutional muster
under this test.
Applying the Turner test in its original form to prisoners' Estab-
lishment Clause claims would, however, largely eviscerate its core
purposes-to protect religious liberty and prohibit governmentally
ordained religious orthodoxy. For example, the Turner test would
condone compelling prisoners to meet with a minister or rabbi,
read the Bible or Koran, attend congregate worship services, or live
in a faith-based unit if such activities could be rationally linked to
the government's interests in abating crime or in making prisons
safer and more secure. Yet such propulsion of prisoners into reli-
gious activities prescribed by prison officials would seem to be a
paradigmatic example of the governmental "establishment of relig-
ion" proscribed by the First Amendment.
The Turner test therefore needs to be somewhat amplified in the
Establishment Clause context to avert the subversion of that consti-
tutional provision's core purposes. Specifically, a voluntariness
requirement and a neutrality requirement need to be added to the
basic constitutional framework. Under this approach, a kind of
"Turner test with teeth," governmental funding of religious services
and programs for prisoners, whether rendered inside or outside a
249. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224 (1990).
250. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
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faith-based unit, is constitutional if three requirements are met:
one, the monetary outlays are reasonably related to the further-
ance of a legitimate governmental interest; two, a prisoner's receipt
of those services or participation in those programs is the result of
his or her own voluntary choice; and three, the funding program,
when viewed from the perspective of a reasonable person with an
awareness of the overall context in which the funding program has
been implemented, manifests neutrality between religion and irre-
ligion and between various religious sects.
To add still further requirements to the list of those that must be
met when a prisoner asserts an Establishment Clause claim, how-
ever, would effectively establish a constitutional hierarchy under
which the right protected by the Establishment Clause is at the
apex. According such preferential treatment to the Establishment
Clause would not be in keeping with the deferential norm that has
been the consistent trademark of Supreme Court caselaw on pris-
oners' rights for the past three decades. In addition, applying a
significantly different and more rigorous constitutional standard to
prisoners' Establishment Clause claims, as compared to their
claims grounded on the Free Exercise Clause, would result in a
paradoxical disequilibrium between the two constitutional provi-
sions: prison officials would be granted great leeway when their
actions restrict inmates' exercise of their religious beliefs, but
prison officials' discretion would be narrowly constrained when
their actions would facilitate inmates' exercise of their religious
beliefs. The end and ironical result would be a constitutional dou-
ble standard-the very antithesis of the governmental neutrality on
religious matters that the Establishment Clause demands.
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